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HOUSE SWAPS: A STRATEGIC BANKRUPTCY
SOLUTION TO THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS
Lynn M. LoPucki*
Since the price peak in 2006, home values have fallen more than 30 percent,
leaving millions of Americans with negative equity in their homes. Until the
Supreme Court’s 1993 decision in Nobelman v. American Savings Bank, the
bankruptcy system would have provided many such homeowners with a rem-
edy. They could have filed bankruptcy, discharged the negative equity, com-
mitted to pay the mortgage holders the full values of their homes, and retained
those homes. In Nobelman, however, the Court misinterpreted reasonably
clear statutory language and invented legislative history to resolve a three-to-
one split of circuits in favor of the minority view that debtors could not modify
even the unsecured portions of the mortgages on their principal residences.
Courts and commentators have since assumed that modifying home mortgages
in bankruptcy is impossible.
This Article presents a legal strategy for modifying home mortgages despite
Nobelman. The strategy requires that debtors move out of their houses, lease
the houses for one year, file bankruptcy, and propose mortgage modification
plans that pay mortgage holders the full current values of the houses. This
Article argues that despite the artificiality of a move-out with the intention to
return, bankruptcy judges will approve the modification plans. The judges will
do so because existing precedent requires approval and because the modifica-
tion plans will be in the best interests of not only the debtors but also the
mortgage holders and the American economy. The strategy will enable hun-
dreds of thousands of homeowners to retain homes they would otherwise have
lost to foreclosure.
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Introduction
The nonmodifiability of home mortgages in bankruptcy is one of the
many ways in which the American legal system is rigged against the middle
class.1 The bankruptcy system allows debtors to strip mortgages and security
interest debts down to the collateral value on virtually every kind of debt,
except the two kinds that middle-class Americans are most likely to owe: (1)
mortgages against individual debtors’ principal residences and (2) security
interests in individual debtors’ automobiles if the debtors financed those
automobiles within the 910-day period preceding bankruptcy. By contrast,
corporations, large or small, can strip down and modify mortgages or secur-
ity interests against any kind of asset—including homes acquired through
foreclosure and automobiles financed in the 910-day period preceding bank-
ruptcy. Wealthy individuals can likewise strip down and modify mortgages
against second and third homes.
Contrary to popular belief, the inability to strip down home mortgages
does not result from congressional action. It is the product of the Supreme
Court’s 1993 decision in Nobelman v. American Savings Bank.2 In that case,
the Court ignored the plain meaning of Bankruptcy Code subsection
1. Bankruptcy expert and now U.S. senator Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) has advanced
the theme that the nation’s economic system is “rigged against [the middle class]”:
I’m here tonight to talk about hard-working people: people who get up early, stay up late,
cook dinner and help out with homework; people who can be counted on to help their
kids, their parents, their neighbors, and the lady down the street whose car broke down;
people who work their hearts out but are up against a hard truth—the game is rigged
against them.
Elizabeth Warren, Democratic Convention Speech (Sept. 5, 2012), available at http://abcnews.
go.com/Politics/OTUS/transcript-elizabeth-warrens-democratic-convention-speech/story?id=
17164726.
2. 508 U.S. 324 (1993).
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1322(b)(2) and invented legislative history to resolve a conflict of circuits
against the majority view.3
This Article presents a legal strategy by which individuals can modify
their home mortgages and retain their homes despite Nobelman.4 The strat-
egy requires that debtors move out of their homes for periods of one year. In
most parts of the United States, judges need only follow well-established
legal precedent for the strategy to succeed.
The implementation of this strategy has important implications not
only for individuals struggling to save their homes but also for the American
economy. Five years after the onset of the financial crisis, the United States
remains mired in the ensuing mortgage foreclosure crisis.5 Negative equity—
debtors owing more than their homes are worth—drives the crisis.6 At the
end of the first quarter of 2013, about one in five of the approximately 49
million home mortgages outstanding in the United States—about 9.7 mil-
lion—still exceeded the value of the home.7
Homeowners with negative equity are more likely to default. For exam-
ple, a recent study found that an additional 16% of homeowners who owed
more than 140% of the values of their homes transitioned into default each
year, as compared with only 2.5% of homeowners with equity.8 Once home-
owners transitioned into default, the odds were “well over 90%” that the
homeowners would never resume payments unless their loans were
modified.9
The process that follows mortgage default is highly inefficient. Foreclo-
sure takes months and sometimes years.10 In the interim, the debtor is often
3. See infra Section III.B.
4. The idea of moving out of the house to render the mortgage modifiable dates back to
at least 2000. See Lynn M. LoPucki & Elizabeth Warren, Secured Credit 284 (3d ed.
2000). The idea of a swap, as opposed to a mere move-out, originated with Cornell University
Law School professor Robert C. Hockett. Robert Hockett, How About Home Lease Swapping as
a Mortgage Market Cure?, benzinga (Oct. 14, 2011, 3:01 PM), http://www.benzinga.com/
news/11/10/1987688/how-about-home-lease-swapping-as-a-mortgage-market-cure.
5. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Lynch, Op-Ed., The Second-Mortgage Shell Game, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 18, 2013, at A17, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/18/opinion/the-second-
mortgage-shell-game.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (arguing that through a foreclosure settle-
ment ostensibly intended to keep people in their homes, “banks have been given a backdoor
mechanism to continue foreclosures at the same pace as before”).
6. Laurie S. Goodman et al., The Case for Principal Reductions, J. Structured Fin., Fall
2011, at 29, 29 (“Even controlling for [competing factors] the undeniable conclusion continues
to hold: Equity is the key driver of defaults!”).
7. CoreLogic Reports 850,000 More Residential Properties Return to Positive Equity in First
Quarter of 2013, CoreLogic (June 12, 2013), http://www.corelogic.com/about-us/news/core-
logic-reports-850,000-more-residential-properties-return-to-positive-equity-in-first-quarter-
of-2013.aspx (“9.7 million, or 19.8 percent of all residential properties with a mortgage, were
still in negative equity at the end of the first quarter of 2013.”).
8. Goodman et al., supra note 6, at 29.
9. Id. at 31 (“[O]nce a loan is 60+ days delinquent and under water, the likelihood of
eventual default (without modification) is generally well over 90%.”).
10. E.g., Lynn M. LoPucki & Elizabeth Warren, Secured Credit 32–36 (7th ed.
2012) (describing foreclosure procedures and duration).
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without the means or the incentive to maintain the property. Some sever
and sell appliances, fixtures, trees, plants, and even basic building materi-
als.11 Mortgage holders must pay attorneys’ fees and court costs. They may
be able to obtain deficiency judgments against their borrowers, but the judg-
ments are usually uncollectible. They must nearly always purchase the prop-
erty at the foreclosure sale.12 The mortgage holder may then incur additional
legal expenses in evicting the former owner. After obtaining possession, the
mortgage holder must maintain the vacant property and pay the costs of
reselling it. The most widely quoted estimates state that, on average, a mort-
gage foreclosure costs the lender $50,00013 or 27% to 60% of the outstanding
loan balance,14 but in actuality, little hard public data exists.
Foreclosures are often personal tragedies for homeowners.15 Homeown-
ers may struggle for years, lose their homes in the end, and sacrifice their
mobility in the interim. The process also destroys their credit ratings.16
Collectively, foreclosures are problematic for the American economy. A
flood of foreclosed homes puts downward pressure on housing prices. Mort-
gage holders’ capital is tied up in illiquid, nonproducing mortgages. The
result is that new loans are often not available for qualified buyers who
11. See, e.g., John Collins Rudolf, Nice Home. Where’s the Rest of It?, N.Y. Times, Dec.
23, 2009, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/23/business/economy/
23stripped.html?pagewanted=all. The article reports,
In Nevada and other states hit hard by the housing crisis, stripping fixtures and appli-
ances from homes in foreclosure has become commonplace. Craigslist, the Web site for
classified ads, functions as a bazaar where stripped items are sold openly. Often, the
stripping is . . . . done by the owner, just before the bank forecloses on the mortgage and
takes the property back.
Id. The debtors who experience this lack of incentive are those who remain in possession of
the home after they realize that they will not be able to keep it and who do not expect to be
held liable for or to pay deficiency judgments.
12. See Jonathon Townsend, Foreclosure Sale Prices: An Empirical Analysis 30–33
(2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (study of Minneapolis mortgage fore-
closure finding that the mortgage holders purchased 98 of 100 homes); see also Steven Wechs-
ler, Through the Looking Glass: Foreclosure by Sale as De Facto Strict Foreclosure—An Empirical
Study of Mortgage Foreclosure and Subsequent Resale, 70 Cornell L. Rev. 850, 875 (1985) (“In
the sample of 118 foreclosure sales, the mortgagee bid successfully in 91 cases, or seventy-
seven percent of the total . . . .”).
13. The 2007 Joint Economic Report, S. Rep. No. 110-251, at 41 (2007), available at
http://www.jec.senate.gov/archive/Documents/Reports/12.19.07%20Annual%20Report.pdf.
14. Mortgage Bankers Assoc., Lenders’ Cost of Foreclosure 2 (2008), available at
http://dcwintonlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Lenders-Cost-of-Foreclosure.pdf; John
Y. Campbell et al., Forced Sales and House Prices, 101 Am. Econ. Rev. 2108, 2110 (2011).
15. Arlo Chase, Rethinking the Homeownership Society: Rental Stability Alternative, 18
J.L. & Pol’y 61, 80–84 (2009) (discussing foreclosure effects on individuals, neighborhoods,
and local governments).
16. Kenneth P. Brevoort & Cheryl R. Cooper, Foreclosure’s Wake: The Credit Experiences
of Individuals Following Foreclosure 2 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series No.
2010-59, 2010), available at http://federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/201059/201059pap.pdf
(“[T]he credit scores of mortgage borrowers entering foreclosure decline to subprime levels,
regardless of their score level before their delinquency, and remain depressed for several years
after foreclosure.”).
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would otherwise have taken advantage of the reduced prices. The workforce
is less mobile because homeowners with negative equity are not entitled to
sell their homes without paying negative equity in cash at closing.
A broad consensus exists that eliminating negative equity through mort-
gage modification is the best solution to the mortgage crisis.17 Bankruptcy
academics overwhelmingly endorse mortgage modification in bankruptcy as
a means to that end.18 Bankruptcy mortgage modification would entitle
qualified debtors to file bankruptcy, strip their mortgages down to the values
of the homes, and agree to pay the remaining balances in full, with interest.
Debtors would benefit by retaining their homes, mortgage holders would
benefit by recovering more than they could get through foreclosure, and the
economy would benefit through the stabilization of the housing market and
the elimination of some of the consumer debt overhang.
Such reform would effectively reverse the Supreme Court’s 1993 deci-
sion in Nobelman v. American Savings Bank.19 In Nobelman, the Court held
that bankrupt homeowners could not strip down mortgages secured only by
the debtors’ principal residences.20 Even after Nobelman, some home mort-
gages remain modifiable because they are secured by nonreal property, such
17. E.g., Cong. Oversight Panel, No. 64-832, March Oversight Report: The Fi-
nal Report of the Congressional Oversight Panel 82 (2011) [hereinafter Congres-
sional Oversight Panel Final Report], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
112shrg64832/pdf/CHRG-112shrg64832.pdf (noting that “[i]n December 2009, the Panel en-
couraged Treasury to consider incentivizing servicers to use principal reduction to deal with
these ‘underwater’ borrowers”); Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Against Learned Helplessness, N.Y.
Times, May 30, 2011, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/30/opinion/
30krugman.html (noting that “[t]he core of our economic problem is, instead, the debt—
mainly mortgage debt—that households ran up during the bubble years of the last decade”
and advocating a serious program of mortgage modification); Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman,
Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech at the Independent Community Bankers of America Annual Conven-
tion (Mar. 4, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke
20080304a.htm (“In this environment, principal reductions that restore some equity for the
homeowner may be a relatively more effective means of avoiding delinquency and
foreclosure.”).
18. E.g., Adam J. Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis: Modifications of Mortgages in
Bankruptcy, 2009 Wis. L. Rev. 565, 647 (“[P]ermitting modification of all home mortgages in
bankruptcy stands out as the best of all possible solutions proposed to the mortgage crisis.”);
Alexandra P. Everhart Sickler, Mitigating the Foreclosure Crisis with Bankruptcy Mortgage Modi-
fications, 9 U.C. Davis Bus. L.J. 85, 92 (2008) (“Because the private sector’s progress has been
too slow to keep pace with record foreclosure rates, bankruptcy mortgage modification is a
necessary complement to the range of solutions that have been proposed or recently initiated
by the government and the private sector.”); Alan M. White, Deleveraging the American Home-
owner: The Failure of 2008 Voluntary Mortgage Contract Modifications, 41 Conn. L. Rev. 1107,
1130 (2009) (“Allowing bankruptcy courts to impose mortgage modifications, including prin-
cipal reductions to align debt with home values, would be a useful step.”). But see Todd J.
Zywicki, Op-Ed., Don’t Let Judges Tear up Mortgage Contracts, Wall St. J., Feb. 13, 2009, at
A13, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123449016984380499.html (arguing that
mortgage modification will result in a windfall to borrowers and an increase in bankruptcy
filings).
19. 508 U.S. 324 (1993).
20. Nobelman, 508 U.S. at 327–32.
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as a mortgage escrow account.21 Because the vast majority of home mort-
gages are secured only by the debtors’ principal residences,22 however, mort-
gage modification is currently not generally available.
Unless someone takes action, the negative equity problem will persist.
One research firm projects that “[a]t the current rate of decline, negative
equity will persist and remain a market factor for years to come, with aver-
age underwater borrowers taking more than 10 years in some markets to
regain positive equity.”23
The strip-down prohibition in subsection 1322(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy
Code applies only to “a claim secured only by a security interest in real
property that is the debtor’s principal residence.”24 Read literally, that lan-
guage does not prohibit modification of a home mortgage once the debtor
ceases use of the home as a principal residence. Most courts that have con-
sidered the issue since Nobelman have read the language literally. They have
held that, if a debtor has, in good faith, moved out of the mortgaged home
prior to filing the bankruptcy case, the house is no longer the debtor’s prin-
cipal residence and the prohibition does not apply.25 As a result, the debtor
can strip the mortgage down.
This reading provides the foundation for a strategy in which debtors
who seek to retain their homes rather than lose them to foreclosure can
move out of their homes in good faith, file under Chapter 13 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, confirm plans that strip down their mortgages, and then move
back into those homes and retain them. This Article explores the real-world
viability of this strategy.
Robert Hockett initially proposed the swap aspect of this strategy.26 This
aspect involves matching two neighbors, each seeking to retain their homes
through bankruptcy. Simultaneously, each leases the home of the other for a
period of one year, moves into it, and files bankruptcy. Both strip down
their mortgages, and, at the end of the leases, both move back into their own
homes.
This strategy will work because it both conforms to the letter of the law
and serves rather than thwarts public policy. A large majority of the courts
21. E.g., In re Bradsher, 427 B.R. 386, 391–92 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2010) (holding that an
escrow account is not real property under North Carolina law and allowing modification).
22. Lenders avoid taking mortgages against principal residences and other collateral
because such mortgages can be modified under Chapter 13. See, e.g., Mary Jo Newborn Wig-
gins & Maj-Le Tate, Bankers to Battle Stations!: Lenders Pounce on Lien Stripping, but Options
Persist for Debtors, Bus. L. Today, Sept.–Oct. 1995, at 24, 28 (“[L]enders should be especially
cautious when considering taking security interests in other property in addition to a debtor’s
principal residence.”).
23. The Private Mortgage Market Investment Act, Part 2: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Capital Mkts. and Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 54
(2011) (statement of Mark Fleming, Chief Economist, CoreLogic), available at http://www.
gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg72632/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg72632.pdf.
24. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2012).
25. See cases cited infra Section II.B.
26. See Hockett, supra note 4.
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that have considered the issue have held that a house is no longer a debtor’s
principal residence once the debtor moves out of it—even if the debtor
plans a later return.27 That the debtor’s purpose in moving is to render the
mortgage eligible for strip-down is not alone sufficient to demonstrate bad
faith. It is merely a type of bankruptcy planning that the courts have held
unobjectionable in analogous contexts. The principal impediment to this
strategy is the myth that Congress intended to prohibit the strip-down mod-
ification of all principal residence mortgages.28
Using the facts of Nobelman, Part I of this Article explains why strip-
down is beneficial not only to homeowners but also to their mortgage hold-
ers and to the economy as a whole.
Part II shows that the majority view favors strip-down on each of the
three legal issues on which the house-swap strategy depends. First, once a
debtor moves out of a home and rents it to someone else, the home is no
longer the debtor’s “principal residence”—even if the debtor plans to return
in the future. Second, whether the home is a debtor’s principal residence for
purposes of bankruptcy strip-down is determined as of the time of bank-
ruptcy, not as of the time of the mortgage contract. Third, debtors who
move out of their homes prior to bankruptcy so that they will be entitled to
strip-down are not, for that reason alone, acting in bad faith and so ren-
dered ineligible for Chapter 13 relief.
Part III addresses the common misconception that Congress sought to
attract capital to the housing market by prohibiting strip-down of all home
mortgages. Although such an intent would be legally irrelevant in light of
the clear statutory language to the contrary, the legislative history contains
no evidence that Congress intended to prohibit all home mortgage strip-
downs.
Part IV describes three kinds of plans through which debtors can pro-
pose to pay their stripped-down mortgages: (1) modification and reinstate-
ment, (2) balloon payment, and (3) house distribution. Under existing case
law, all, some, or none of these options might be available in a particular
district. Part V explains the practical advantages of swapping houses rather
than simply moving out and renting. The Article concludes that a move-out,
strip-down strategy is viable in most districts and can be implemented with-
out legislation.
I. The Superiority of the Bankruptcy Solution
The facts of Nobelman illustrate the benefits of strip-down.29 Leonard
and Harriet Nobelman filed a case under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy
Code owing $71,335 in principal, interest, and fees against a condominium
27. See cases cited infra note 76.
28. See infra notes 147–150 and accompanying text.
29. See Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 326–27 (1993).
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with an uncontroverted value of only $23,500.30 The condominium was the
Nobelmans’ principal residence.31
The Nobelmans proposed a Chapter 13 plan that would have stripped
the mortgage down to $23,500. The plan provided that they would retain the
house and pay the mortgage holder, American Savings Bank (“American”),
principal and interest on the $23,500 remaining balance.32 Resolving a cir-
cuit split of three to one33 in favor of the minority view, the Supreme Court
held that debtors could not strip down mortgages against their principal
residences.34
A. The Debtors’ Perspective
Under the Court’s decision, the Nobelmans would have had to pay
$71,335—three times the property’s value—to retain their home. Their
bankruptcy alternative was to discharge their debts in the bankruptcy case,
including the deficiency owing to American on the mortgage, and thereby
gain a “fresh start” without the home. After bankruptcy, they could have
purchased a condominium just like the one they had lost through foreclo-
sure for $23,500—if they could have financed it. They might also have
rented such a condominium at a rental rate that would have reflected its
$23,500 value. Surrendering the home and discharging the mortgage debt
was obviously the better solution.
Had it been available, the option of stripping down the mortgage debt
and retaining the home would have been better yet. Instead of the hassle and
expense of finding a new home just like it, the Nobelmans could have stayed
in the home they already had. They could have continued to be homeowners
despite their probable inability to qualify for a mortgage on the hypothetical
home-just-like-it.
30. Id. at 326 (stating these amounts and noting that $23,500 was “an uncontroverted
valuation”).
31. Id. at 332 (“Section 1322(b)(2) prohibits such a modification where, as here, the
lender’s claim is secured only by a lien on the debtor’s principal residence.”).
32. Id. at 328 (“[T]he plan proposes to make $23,500 worth of payments pursuant to
the monthly payment terms of the mortgage contract . . . .”).
33. Compare Eastland Mortg. Co. v. Hart (In re Hart), 923 F.2d 1410, 1415 (10th Cir.
1991) (finding that the position taken by the Third and Ninth Circuits “reflects the plain
meaning of section 1322(b)(2)”), and Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortg. Corp., 895 F.2d 123,
127–28 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[S]ection 1322(b)(2) does not preclude modification of the unsecured
portion of an undersecured mortgage debt.”), and Hougland v. Lomas & Nettleton Co. (In re
Hoagland), 886 F.2d 1182, 1184 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that strip-down is allowed because
the term “secured claim” in section 1322 is defined by section 506), with Nobelman v. Am.
Sav. Bank (In re Nobelman), 968 F.2d 483, 487 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Dewsnup v. Timm, 502
U.S. 410 (1992)) (prohibiting cramdown while stating that the Dewsnup opinion “lends sup-
port to this view that bifurcation is impermissible”), aff’d, 508 U.S. 324.
34. Nobelman, 508 U.S. at 322 (“Section 1322(b)(2) prohibits such a modification
where, as here, the lender’s claim is secured only by a lien on the debtor’s principal
residence.”).
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B. The Mortgage Lenders’ Perspective
After the decision in Nobelman, American had the right to lift the auto-
matic stay, foreclose on the condominium, buy it at the foreclosure sale for
the amount of the mortgage, evict the Nobelmans, and resell it.
Foreclosed property generally nets creditors about 27 percent less on
average than equivalent properties not involved in foreclosures.35
These discounts are not highly sensitive to the type of housing, but they are
larger for houses with low-priced characteristics in low-priced neighbor-
hoods. This suggests that the foreclosure discount may be related to van-
dalism, through two possible channels. First, foreclosed houses may have
been damaged before they are sold. Second, mortgage lenders must protect
foreclosed houses while they are vacant; the threat of vandalism may be
greater in bad neighborhoods, and costs of protection likely account for a
larger fraction of the value of a low-priced house. The costs of protection
induce mortgage lenders to sell foreclosed houses urgently, leading to dis-
counts in illiquid housing markets.36
If the Nobelmans’ condominium netted American 27 percent less than its
$23,500 market value, American’s total recovery from foreclosure would
have been $17,155. Because the Nobelmans had discharged their debt in
bankruptcy, American could not have recovered a judgment for the portion
of the mortgage debt not paid from the sale proceeds (hereinafter a “defi-
ciency judgment”).
Thus, American probably would have benefitted from strip-down as
well.37 Stay lifting, foreclosure, and resale would have been unnecessary, sav-
ing American the expenses of all three. After strip-down, American would
have been entitled to $23,500 plus interest on that amount.38 The
Nobelmans would have been required to commence payments to American
within thirty days after the bankruptcy case’s filing.39
35. Campbell et al., supra note 14, at 2110 (“We find large foreclosure discounts, about
27 percent on average.”).
36. Id.
37. See Robert J. Shiller, Reviving Real Estate Requires Collective Action, N.Y. Times,
June 24, 2012, at B6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/24/business/economy/real-
estates-collective-action-problem.html (“[I]t is well known that in foreclosures, lenders lose so
much on the legal costs and depressed market values of the homes that it would be in their
interest to lower mortgage balances so the homeowners stay in place and don’t default.”).
38. The Bankruptcy Code provides,
[T]he court shall confirm a plan if . . . with respect to each allowed secured claim pro-
vided for by the plan . . . the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be
distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not less than the allowed amount
of such claim.
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (2012).
39. See id. § 1326(a)(1) (“Unless the court orders otherwise, the debtor shall commence
making payments not later than 30 days after the date of the filing of the plan or the order for
relief, whichever is earlier . . . .”).
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The benefit to American is less clear than the benefit to the Nobelmans
because the Nobelmans might not have made the payments under their
plan.40 Had they not done so, American would have been permitted to fore-
close. But American would also have incurred additional expenses and in the
end possibly recovered less than $17,155.
On the other hand, the Nobelmans must have been people of some eco-
nomic substance. They had qualified to pay a $68,000 mortgage when they
bought the condominium just a few years before. Through discharge, the
Nobelmans’ bankruptcy would free them from nonmortgage obligations
that had been competing for their income. To strip the mortgage down, the
Nobelmans would have had to prove, to the satisfaction of the bankruptcy
judge, that they would have been able to make payments on the $23,500
obligation.41 Thus, it seems likely that American would have recovered more
from bankruptcy strip-down than from foreclosure.
Why, then, do lenders frequently object to strip-down plans? Lenders
may choose a low foreclosure recovery over the probability of a higher strip-
down recovery because foreclosure may deter the lenders’ other borrowers
from filing bankruptcy. Most debtors who cannot make the payments on
their homes neither file bankruptcy nor walk away. They continue their ef-
forts to pay, often well beyond the point at which they have any reasonable
hope of success.42
This continuation benefits lenders in several ways. First, lenders con-
tinue to receive some payments—on a $68,000 mortgage rather than a
$23,500 mortgage. Second, fees, penalties, and default interest accrue on a
mortgage, increasing the potential profits in cases where debtors ultimately
succeed in paying. Third, the value of a home may rise while a debtor strug-
gles to make payments. If it does, the value of a lender’s foreclosure right
rises along with it. But these benefits are better viewed as flowing from debt-
ors’ erroneous beliefs that they can succeed in retaining their home than
from the creditors’ legal rights. If debtors were better informed, these bene-
fits would not exist.
Factors other than self-interest may account for much of the lender re-
sistance to strip-down. First, asset-securitization contracts sometime pro-
hibit lenders from consenting to modifications that reduce the balance
40. The Supreme Court recently noted that “[t]here is some dispute about the true
scale of [the risk that the plan will fail]—respondent claims that more than 60% of Chapter 13
plans fail, but petitioners argue that the failure rate for approved Chapter 13 plans is much
lower.” Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 480 (2004) (plurality opinion) (citation omit-
ted). But the Court required that Chapter 13 debtors compensate creditors for that risk. Id.
(“Together with the cramdown provision, this requirement obligates the court to select a rate
high enough to compensate the creditor for its risk . . . .”).
41. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6) (“[T]he court shall confirm a plan if . . . the debtor will
be able to make all payments under the plan and to comply with the plan . . . .”).
42. Peter S. Goodman, U.S. Loan Effort Is Seen as Adding to Housing Woes, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 2, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/02/business/economy/
02modify.html?pagewanted=all (“[D]esperate homeowners have sent payments to banks in
often-futile efforts to keep their homes, which some see as wasting dollars they could have
saved in preparation for moving to cheaper rental residences.”).
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owing on the mortgage loan.43 In those cases, lenders cannot consent, even if
the proposed reductions would benefit them. Second, servicing agents who
act on behalf of lenders may have conflicts of interest. That is, their servicing
contracts may provide for higher servicing fees when debtors remain in de-
fault than when their loans have been reinstated through strip-down.44
Third, lenders and their representatives may simply have an emotional pref-
erence for controlling the repayment process. If strip-down is permitted, a
bankruptcy judge decides which debtors get repayment plans and how much
those debtors must pay for them. If strip-down is not permitted, the lender
makes that decision alone. Even if the lenders did not believe that they
would make better decisions than judges, they might simply prefer to retain
control.
Mortgage holders are likely to recover more under Chapter 13 plans
than they would through foreclosures. To confirm plans, bankruptcy judges
must find that the debtors proposing them will be able to pay the mortgage
holders the full values of their homes.45 Mortgage holders should not be able
to veto plans that are in their own interests. The risks are that the mortgage
holders might use their veto powers to gain illegitimate advantages over their
debtors and that the agency problems discussed previously might result in
veto abuse.
C. The Social Perspective
Economists agree that the “debt overhang” constituting the mortgage
crisis is bad for the economy.46 Debtors who owe more on their houses than
43. Anna Gelpern & Adam J. Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts: Workout
Prohibitions in Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities, 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1075, 1089–91 (2009)
(presenting evidence of the nature of these prohibitions and reviewing the literature regarding
their prevalence).
44. E.g., Christopher Mayer et al., Essay, A New Proposal for Loan Modifications, 26 Yale
J. on Reg. 417, 417 (2009); see also Congressional Oversight Panel Final Report, supra
note 17, at 68 (“[I]ncentives built into the mortgage servicing system often make foreclosures
more attractive than modification.”). But see Manuel Adelino et al., Why Don’t Lenders Rene-
gotiate More Home Mortgages? Redefaults, Self-Cures, and Securitization 1 (Fed. Reserve Bank of
Bos., Pub. Pol’y Discussion Paper No. 09-4, 2009), available at http://www.bos.frb.org/eco-
nomic/ppdp/2009/ppdp0904.pdf (claiming that their proprietary data show that “servicers re-
negotiate similarly small fractions of loans that they hold in their [unsecuritized] portfolios”).
45. That is, the debtor must offer to pay the full value of the collateral, see 11 U.S.C.
§§ 506(a), 1325(a)(5), and the court must find that “the debtor will be able to make all pay-
ments under the plan,” id. § 1325(a)(6).
46. For example, the Federal Reserve Board recently stated,
Looking forward, continued weakness in the housing market poses a significant barrier to
a more vigorous economic recovery. . . . [T]here is scope for policymakers to take action
along three dimensions that could ease some of the pressures afflicting the housing mar-
ket. In particular, policies could be considered that would help moderate the inflow of
properties into the large inventory of unsold homes . . . .
Fed. Reserve Bd., The U.S. Housing Market: Current Conditions and Policy Consid-
erations 1 (2012), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/other-reports/files/
housing-white-paper-20120104.pdf.
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the houses are worth cannot sell or refinance the houses to take advantage of
record-low mortgage interest rates. The mortgage foreclosure process con-
sumes the resources of those on both sides in a zero-sum game. The conflict
over evicting debtors from their homes frequently results in the wasteful
removal and sale of fixtures, landscaping, and building materials, and some-
times even in the destruction of the property.47 Foreclosure floods the mar-
ket with houses, which drives house prices down, reducing the wealth of all
homeowners.48 Repossessing banks sell the houses to investors who must
then spend additional resources finding people to occupy the houses.49
House values and interest rates have declined sharply since many bor-
rowers bought their homes. As a result, many borrowers (“Can-Pay-Value
Borrowers”) cannot afford to pay the balances owing on their mortgages but
can nonetheless afford to pay the full values of their houses. The best solu-
tion to the mortgage foreclosure crisis is for Can-Pay-Value Borrowers to
remain in their houses and pay their values, plus interest at the current mar-
ket rates, to their mortgage holders. Keeping borrowers in their homes with
payment that they can afford prevents physical decline in the conditions of
the houses,50 increases values in the neighborhoods by keeping houses off
the market,51 saves the high costs of mortgage foreclosure and occupant
turnover, and minimizes conflict between homeowners and their mortga-
gors.52 Allowing Can-Pay-Value Borrowers to remain in their homes imposes
little or no cost on mortgagees.
Other similarly situated borrowers (“Can-Pay-Loan-Balance Borrow-
ers”) have the financial ability to pay the full amounts of their mortgages
47. E.g., Rudolf, supra note 11.
48. Stephan Whitaker & Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV, The Impact of Vacant, Tax-Delin-
quent, and Foreclosed Property on Sales Prices of Neighboring Homes 7–11 (Fed. Reserve Bank of
Cleveland, Working Paper No. 11-23R, 2012), available at http://www.clevelandfed.org/re-
search/workpaper/2011/wp1123r.pdf (reviewing the literature measuring the adverse effect of
foreclosures on the values of neighboring homes); see also Congressional Oversight Panel
Final Report, supra note 17, at 89 (“As foreclosure starts and completions have remained at a
persistently high level, home prices have continued to fall.”).
49. See David Dayen, Your New Landlord Works on Wall Street: Hedge Funds Are Snatch-
ing up Rental Homes at an Alarming Rate, New Republic (Feb. 12, 2013), http://www.
newrepublic.com/article/112395/wall-street-hedge-funds-buy-rental-properties (“Over the
past couple years, hedge funds, private equity firms and the biggest banks have raised massive
amounts of capital to buy distressed or foreclosed single-family homes, often in bulk, at bar-
gain prices. Their strategy is to convert them to rental units for a while before reselling them
when prices appreciate.”).
50. See Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The Impact of Single-Family Mortgage Foreclo-
sures on Neighborhood Crime, 21 Housing Stud. 851, 863 (2006) (finding empirically that
higher neighborhood foreclosure rates lead to higher levels of violent crime at appreciable
levels).
51. Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The External Costs of Foreclosure: The Impact of
Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosures on Property Values, 17 Housing Pol’y Debate 57, 58
(2006) (finding that foreclosures of conventional single-family loans have a significant impact
on nearby property values).
52. Supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text.
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with interest at the contract rates. One could argue that Can-Pay-Loan-Bal-
ance Borrowers should be relieved of their obligations to pay negative equity
to provide equitable treatment in comparison with Can-Pay-Value Borrow-
ers. But that relief might reduce mortgage holders’ recoveries while produc-
ing few of the social benefits discussed above.
The tension that results from granting debt relief to those who have
managed their finances badly, while denying debt relief to others who have
managed their finances well, is inherent in bankruptcy.53 “Equity,” in the
bankruptcy sense, is achieved by providing a “fresh start” to any honest
debtor who reaches a certain level of distress. Bankruptcy policy is keyed not
so much to fairness as to necessity. Excessive debt generates antisocial incen-
tives. The resulting behavior, often referred to as “informal bankruptcy,” is
both a social and an economic problem.54 If relief is not provided, debtors
tend toward deception, fraud, and irresponsibility in their economic behav-
ior. Bankruptcy prevents these adverse consequences. The price of bank-
ruptcy is that it is public and many observers will consider the filing an
acknowledgement of failure that imposes considerable stigma.55 The fresh
start policy is not entirely unfair because Can-Pay-Loan-Balance Borrowers
do not incur that stigma.
The Bush and Obama Administrations have each created several new
programs for the purpose of enabling various categories of home mortgage
borrowers to remain in their homes.56 In defining eligibility, each program
grappled with the problem of equity, and in implementing its standards of
53. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, Common Sense Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 Am. Bankr.
L.J. 461, 463–67 (1997) (discussing this tension in a subsection entitled “Offending Basic Con-
cepts of Economic Justice”).
54. Amanda E. Dawsey et al., Non-Judicial Debt Collection and the Consumer’s Choice
Among Repayment, Bankruptcy and Informal Bankruptcy, 87 Am. Bankr. L.J. 1, 6 (2013)
(“[C]onsumers who choose informal bankruptcy may be more apt to participate in the under-
ground economy, which can also generate significant transactions and societal costs.” (foot-
note omitted)); Elizabeth Warren, A Principled Approach to Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 Am.
Bankr. L.J. 483, 492 (1997) (“[Debtors] need the chance to remain productive members of
society, not [to be] driven underground or into joblessness by unpayable debt.”).
55. Teresa A. Sullivan et al., Less Stigma or More Financial Distress: An Empirical Analysis
of the Extraordinary Increase in Bankruptcy Filings, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 213, 239 (2006) (“[T]he
rise in bankruptcy filings cannot be attributed in any significant part to a decline in the stigma
associated with bankruptcy.”); see also Sickler, supra note 18, at 104–05 (“There is also little
danger that bankruptcy mortgage modification will supplant industry efforts and flood bank-
ruptcy courts with Chapter 13 debtors. Bankruptcy is a costly and painful process for debtors
and therefore ‘remains the refuge of last resort’ for those who cannot pay their debts. It is a
common sense proposition that most borrowers will avoid bankruptcy and its negative credit
consequences until they have exhausted all other options.” (footnote omitted)).
56. Congressional Oversight Panel Final Report, supra note 17, at 69–71 (listing
sixteen such programs).
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eligibility, each program created a new and inexperienced bureaucracy.57
One after another, these programs failed.58
Many policymakers realize that the bankruptcy system already provides
a superior program for enabling distressed borrowers to remain in their
homes. The bankruptcy system provides standards of eligibility for mortgage
relief and judges experienced in administering them.59 In the spring of 2009,
the Obama Administration advanced a bill to overturn Nobelman. That bill
passed the House but failed in the Senate by a vote of forty-five to fifty-
one.60 No effort is underway for additional congressional action. Fortu-
nately, in 1978, Congress left enough flexibility in subsection 1322(d)(2) of
the Bankruptcy Code for debtors, debtors’ attorneys, and bankruptcy judges
to achieve the same result without additional congressional action. As
should be apparent from this Article, the strategies for achieving strip-down
are complex and difficult to implement. But once implemented, they will
provide substantial benefits for debtors, mortgage holders, and the Ameri-
can economy.
In many, if not most, instances, the move-out, strip-down strategy will
provide the most efficient solution to the problem of debtor inability to pay.
The debtor will remain the owner of the house. The bankruptcy court will
require that the debtor devote all the debtor’s disposable income over the
period of the plan to payments under the plan,61 thus eliminating the prob-
lem of moral hazard. The creditor will receive more than it would have if its
debtors were well advised and the option of strip-down did not exist.
II. Legal Issues Presented
This Article’s recommended strategies will be useful to debtors who
meet the following requirements:
57. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Humpty Dumpty and the Foreclosure Crisis: Lessons from the
Lackluster First Year of the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), 52 Ariz. L. Rev.
727, 771 (2010) (“HAMP involved rapidly putting a bureaucracy in place to manage a reluc-
tant corps of servicers. It also quickly became apparent that the low quality of modifications
HAMP produced raised questions about their sustainability.”).
58. See, e.g., Congressional Oversight Panel Final Report, supra note 17, at 86–87
(showing high levels of HAMP redefaults); Braucher, supra note 57, at 788 (“[HAMP] quickly
bogged down under servicer reluctance and bureaucratic implementation challenges.”).
59. Susan E. Hauser, Cutting the Gordian Knot: The Case for Allowing Modification of
Home Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 5 J. Bus. & Tech. L. 207, 227 (2010) (“[T]he bankruptcy
system brings with it an experienced corps of valuation experts. Bankruptcy judges already
value property on a daily basis and are eminently qualified to determine accurate property
values in the local areas they serve.”).
60. Editorial, As Foreclosures Surge . . ., N.Y. Times, May 4, 2009, at A22, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/04/opinion/04mon2.html (“The Obama administration sat
by last week as 12 Senate Democrats joined 39 Senate Republicans to block a vote on an
amendment that would have allowed bankruptcy judges to modify troubled mortgages.”).
61. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1) (2012) (“[T]he court may not approve the plan unless . . .
the plan provides that all of the debtor’s projected disposable income to be received in the
applicable commitment period . . . will be applied to make payments to unsecured creditors
under the plan . . . .”).
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(1) Each of the debtors owns and occupies a house and owes a mortgage
against it that substantially exceeds its current market value. Each wants to
retain ownership.
(2) Each is eligible to be a debtor under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy
Code. In general, debtors are eligible to file under Chapter 13 if they are
either an individual or an individual and the individual’s spouse who, on the
date of the petition, have regular income and owe noncontingent, liquidated,
unsecured debts of less than $383,175 and noncontingent, liquidated, se-
cured debts of less than $1,149,525.62
(3) Each of the debtors has not engaged in wrongful conduct that would
disqualify the debtor from bankruptcy under the “good faith” provisions of
Chapter 13. Those provisions disqualify individuals otherwise eligible, if the
individuals have engaged in various kinds of wrongful conduct.63
(4) Each is capable of making the payments on a stripped-down mort-
gage, including interest at the current market rate.
(5) Each has not covenanted to continue using the house as a principal
residence. (The large majority of mortgages in the United States do not con-
tain such a covenant.)
Even if a debtor meets all these requirements, three potential legal issues
remain. The first is whether a house remains the owner’s principal residence
if the debtor moves out with the intent to later move back in. The second is
whether the Bankruptcy Code prohibits strip-down if the house was the
debtor’s principal residence at the time of the mortgage contract, or if it
only prohibits strip-down if the house was the debtor’s principal residence
at the time of bankruptcy. The third is whether a debtor who moves out of a
principal residence for the purpose of qualifying for strip-down is proceed-
ing in bad faith. As the following Sections explain, courts have already re-
solved each of these issues in favor of the move-out, strip-down strategy.
A. The Definition of “Principal Residence”
The Bankruptcy Code defines “debtor’s principal residence” as “a resi-
dential structure if used as the principal residence by the debtor.”64 By defi-
nition, a debtor can only have one principal residence at a time.65 Whatever
structure the debtor principally “uses” as a residence at a particular time is
the debtor’s principal residence at that time.66
62. See id. § 109(e) note (Adjustment of Dollar Amounts).
63. Id. § 1325(a)(3), (7) (requiring that the debtor file the petition and propose the
plan in good faith).
64. Id. § 101(13A)(A).
65. In re Stanley, 461 B.R. 161, 165 n.3 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2011) (“A homeowner may
have only one principal residence.”).
66. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 54:4-8.58 (West 2002 & Supp. 2013) (“ ‘Principal residence’
means a homestead actually and continually occupied by a claimant as the claimant’s perma-
nent residence, as distinguished from a vacation home, property owned and rented or offered
for rent by the claimant, and other secondary real property holdings.”); In re Boward, 334 B.R.
350, 352 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005) (holding that “uses as a residence” in 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1)
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To say that a debtor who has moved out and rented the house to a
tenant, but who intends to move back in one year, is presently “using” the
structure as the debtor’s principal residence strains the Code’s language. It is
more accurate to say that the debtor is using the structure as rental property.
Some authorities treat future intent as the basis for distinguishing “resi-
dence” from “domicile.”67 By that definition, “residence” means present oc-
cupancy without the intent to remain permanently; domicile requires intent
to remain permanently. For example, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “resi-
dence” as follows:
The place where one actually lives, as distinguished from a domicile . . . .
Residence usu[ally] just means bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given
place; domicile usu[ally] requires bodily presence plus an intention to make
the place one’s home. A person thus may have more than one residence at
a time but only one domicile.68
Numerous other authorities make the same distinction between residence
and domicile.69 Some state exemption statutes also define residence in a
manner that ignores future intention.70
“is free of ambiguity and plain in its meaning: the debtor must be residing in the property at
the time of the commencement of the bankruptcy case”); In re Shell, 295 B.R. 129, 131 (Bankr.
D. Alaska 2003) (“A ‘principal residence’ is defined as ‘the actual dwelling place of an individ-
ual . . . .’ ”).
67. For example, Norton states,
“Domicile” and “residence” are distinct terms and should not be used interchangeably. A
person is “domiciled” in only a single place where that person has established a physical
presence with an intent to remain there and with the intention to return there when the
debtor may be at other locations. “Residence,” on the other hand, generally refers to
presence as an inhabitant in a given place.
1 William L. Norton, Jr., Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice 3d § 17:4 (William L.
Norton, Jr. & William L. Norton, III eds., 2008) (footnotes omitted). Similarly, for exemption
purposes, several courts have made the same distinction between domicile and residence. As
one court put it,
Domicile has been defined as a place where a person has a permanent home and an
intention of returning. The term “residence” on the other hand does not include the
intention required for domicile. “Residence means living in a particular locality, but
domicile means living in that locality with intent to make it a fixed and permanent
home.”
In re Marsico, 278 B.R. 1, 14 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2002) (citations omitted) (quoting Black’s Law
Dictionary 1176 (5th ed. 1979)).
68. Black’s Law Dictionary 1423 (9th ed. 2009).
69. See supra note 67.
70. E.g., Alaska Stat. § 09.38.500(12) (2012) (“ ‘[P]rincipal residence’ means the ac-
tual dwelling place of an individual or dependents of the individual and includes real and
personal property.”); Gottstein v. Kraft, 274 P.3d 469, 476 (Alaska 2012). But see Roberts v.
Twp. of W. Bloomfield, No. 303098, 2012 Mich. App. LEXIS 921, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. May
10, 2012) (“A ‘principal residence’ is defined as ‘the 1 place where an owner of the property
has his or her true, fixed, and permanent home to which, whenever absent, he or she intends
to return and that shall continue as a principal residence until another principal residence is
established.’ ”).
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Of course, absence from the residence structure on a temporary or tran-
sient basis does not interrupt residency.71 When a debtor temporarily moves
to a second home, most authorities determine which is the debtor’s princi-
pal residence by considering actual occupancy during the current year. Thus,
for example, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
states that “[a] principal residence is a property that will be occupied by the
borrower for the majority of the calendar year.”72 Other authorities define
principal residence as the house the person occupies for more than half the
current year, without regard for the person’s intentions.73
Under these authorities, if a debtor were to move out of a mortgaged
house and rent it for one year, the house would no longer be the debtor’s
principal residence. That would remain true even if the debtor intended to
move back into the house at the end of the year.
At least one authority, however, treats residence as the equivalent of
domicile.74 That gives rise to the possibility that if a debtor has moved out of
a house but intends to return, a court would regard the house as the debtor’s
principal residence. In this scenario, to ensure that a court would not con-
sider the house to be the debtor’s principal residence, the debtor would not
only have to move out and rent the house; the debtor would also have to
abandon the intention to return.
In the context of strip-down, the effect of requiring abandonment
would be to create an odd circularity. If a court rules that a house is a
debtor’s principal residence because the debtor intends to return to it, the
debtor would not be able to strip the mortgage down, would lose the home,
and would therefore not be able to return to it. Any debtor who realized that
this would be the effect of having an intention to return to the home could
not hold such an intention. Having thus abandoned the intention to return,
the debtor would be entitled to retain the home. This problem will rarely
71. E.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 54:4-8.58.
72. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., HUD 4155.1, Mortgage Credit Analysis
for Mortgage Insurance, at 4-B-5 (2011), available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/adm/
hudclips/handbooks/hsgh/4155.1/41551HSGH.pdf.
73. Idaho Code Ann. § 55-1006 (2012) (“A homestead is presumed abandoned if the
owner vacates the property for a continuous period of at least six (6) months.”); Md. Code
Ann., Educ. § 24-513(4) (LexisNexis 2008) (“ ‘Principal residence’ means a dwelling actually
occupied or expected to be actually occupied by the homeowner or the homeowners for more
than 6 consecutive months of the present calendar year.”); Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 145.245(1)(a)(3)(c) (West 2006 & Supp. 2012) (“ ‘Principal residence’ means a residence
which is occupied at least 51% of the year by the owner.”).
74. Boyer v. Sylvester, No. CPU4-10-003496, 2011 Del. C.P. LEXIS 14, at *17 (Del. Ct.
Com. Pl. July 1, 2011) (“[I]in Delaware, the term ‘resident’ is often equated with the legal term
of ‘domicile.’ ” (quoting Williamson v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., No. 04C-07-033 RFS, 2005 Del.
Super. LEXIS 281, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 19, 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
But see Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 48 (1989) (“[O]ne can reside
in one place but be domiciled in another.”); In re Lozada Rivera, 470 B.R. 109, 115 (Bankr.
D.P.R. 2012) (“The term ‘residence’ is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code. It is not synony-
mous of ‘domicile’ because ‘the specified enumeration of each in the Code indicates an inten-
tion to maintain a legal distinction between them.’ ” (quoting In re Marsico, 278 B.R. 1, 4
(Bankr. D.N.H. 2002))).
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arise, however, because future intent is considered irrelevant to residency in
nearly all jurisdictions. In a jurisdiction where it is relevant, the circularity
just described may be evidence of a debtor’s lack of intention to return.
B. The Timing Issue
The strip-down strategy raises a timing issue: whether modification is
prohibited if a home was a debtor’s principal residence at the mortgage’s
creation or only if it was the debtor’s principal residence at the bankruptcy
case’s filing. The identically worded antimodification provisions that appear
in subsections 1322(b)(2) and 1123(b)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code shield
from modification “a claim secured only by a security interest in real prop-
erty that is the debtor’s principal residence.”75 Because these provisions are
part of the Bankruptcy Code, they can only apply if and when the debtor
files bankruptcy. The provisions’ use of the present tense makes clear that,
for the provisions to apply, the real property must be the debtor’s principal
residence when the debtor files bankruptcy. As this Section will demon-
strate, the courts have overwhelmingly interpreted this language to mean
that if real property is not a debtor’s principal residence at the time of bank-
ruptcy, the debtor is entitled to modify the mortgages against it. No differ-
ences between the two antimodification provisions exist that are relevant to
the issues discussed in this Section, so I have not distinguished the cases
discussed below by whether they arose under Chapter 11 or Chapter 13.
Two sets of cases are relevant to the timing issue. “Move-out cases” are
factually similar to the strategies recommended in this Article and are thus
more directly relevant to the timing issue than are “different-collateral
cases.” In move-out cases, debtors have granted mortgages against houses
that were their principal residences, moved out prior to bankruptcy, and
then sought to modify the mortgages. Different-collateral cases are less di-
rectly relevant but still raise the timing issue. In different-collateral cases,
debtors remain in their houses at bankruptcy, but the mortgage collateral is
different at the time of bankruptcy than it was at the time of the mortgage
transaction. In both kinds of cases, the issue is whether the antimodification
provisions should be applied to circumstances as they existed at the time of
the mortgage contract or as they existed at the time of bankruptcy. I discuss
the two kinds of cases separately.
1. The Move-Out Cases
To determine how the courts have resolved the timing issue, I reviewed
all cases reported on Westlaw or Lexis in which a court decided or addressed
that issue. In ten such cases, debtors granted mortgages against their princi-
pal residences, moved out prior to bankruptcy, and then sought to modify
their mortgages in Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 plans.76 In each of the ten cases,
75. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(b)(2), 1123(b)(5) (2012) (emphasis added).
76. Mariner’s Inv. Fund, LLC ex rel. Second Mariners Inv. Fund REO, LLC v. Delfierro
(In re Delfierro), No. WW-11-1249-KiJuH, 2012 WL 1933316 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. May 29, 2012);
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the mortgage lender objected, citing the antimodification provision. In nine
of the ten cases, the courts denied the mortgage holder’s objection, holding
that principal residence status must be determined as of the filing of the
bankruptcy case.77
In the lone exception, In re Smart, the court denied the debtor’s motion
for modification.78 Although the house in Smart was not the debtor’s princi-
pal residence at the time of bankruptcy, the court held that the debtor could
not modify the mortgage because the house had been the debtor’s principal
residence at the time of the mortgage transaction.79
Smart is weak authority, however, because the logic of the court’s argu-
ment fails in two ways. The first failure occurred when the court held that
the antimodification provision was ambiguous regarding the time as of
which it should determine principal residence status (the “timing issue”).80
Recall that the antimodification provision states that “the plan may . . .
modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured
only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor’s principal resi-
dence.”81 This is the entirety of the Smart court’s erroneous reasoning re-
garding that language:
Rather than focusing on the remotely antecedent term, “claim”, this Court
believes that the critical phrase, “real property that is the debtor’s principal
residence”, is intended to modify its more immediate antecedent term, “se-
curity interest”. With that focus, this Court believes that the subject clause
is susceptible of at least two credible interpretations. First, it can be read, as
the Debtors suggest, to refer to a home’s status as a principal residence at
the present time (or the petition date). Second, it can be read, as urged by
[the Connecticut Housing Finance Authority (“CHFA”)], to refer to the
home’s status at the time that the security interest was created. To avoid this
ambiguity, congressional drafters needed to employ more modifying
Benafel v. One W. Bank, FSB (In re Benafel), 461 B.R. 581 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011); BAC Home
Loans Servicing, LP v. Abdelgadir (In re Abdelgadir), 455 B.R. 896 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011); In re
Putnam, No. 10-14079, 2011 WL 5839692 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2011); In re Christopher-
son, 446 B.R. 831 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2011); In re Roemer, 421 B.R. 23 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2009);
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Jordan (In re Jordan), 330 B.R. 857 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2005); Jackson
v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. (In re Jackson), 318 B.R. 229, 232 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2004); In re Smart,
214 B.R. 63, 68 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1997); In re Lebrun, 185 B.R. 665 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995).
77. In re Delfierro, 2012 WL 1933316, at *1; In re Benafel, 461 B.R. at 588; In re Abdel-
gadir, 455 B.R. at 903; In re Putnam, 2011 WL 5839692, at *1; In re Christopherson, 446 B.R. at
835; In re Roemer, 421 B.R. at 23; In re Jordan, 330 B.R. at 860; In re Jackson, 318 B.R. at 232; In
re Lebrun, 185 B.R. at 666.
78. In re Smart, 214 B.R. at 68.
79. Id. (“[T]his Court allies itself philosophically with those Courts which approach
post-Nobelman modification issues from the perspective of the circumstances existing at the
time of the subject credit transaction, not the serendipitous or manipulated facts existing on
the date of the filing of the petition.”).
80. Id. (“By failing to be more explicit, Congress left an ambiguity in the statute which
compels recourse to its legislative history.”).
81. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2012).
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words. For instance, if Congress had intended the Debtors’ suggested con-
struction, it might have drafted the clause as follows: “. . . a claim secured
only by a security interest in real property that is at the time of the filing of
the petition the debtor’s principal residence. . . .”; or alternatively, if the
congressional purpose was consistent with CHFA’s contention, the drafters
might have drawn the clause as follows: “. . . a claim secured only by a
security interest in real property that is at that time the debtor’s principal
residence . . . .” By failing to be more explicit, Congress left an ambiguity in
the statute which compels recourse to its legislative history.82
The court’s error lies in its claim that the words “real property that is
the debtor’s principal residence” can be read to refer to “the home’s status at
the time the security interest was created.”83 The error becomes apparent if
we imagine that Congress added the language proposed in Smart: “at the
time that the security interest was created.”84 The antimodification provision
would then have read, “a claim secured only by a security interest in real
property that is the debtor’s principal residence at the time the security in-
terest was created.” The effect is a clash in the two verbs’ tenses. To correctly
express the meaning that Smart ascribes to the provision, the “is” would
have to become “was”: “real property that was the debtor’s principal resi-
dence at the time the security interest was created.” Seventeen courts have
addressed the timing issue since Smart. None have repeated or endorsed the
Smart court’s argument for ambiguity. That argument is simply wrong.
Having reached the legislative history through error, the Smart court
then misinterpreted it to reach the conclusion that the court should deter-
mine the debtor’s principal residence as of the time of the mortgage transac-
tion.85 This misinterpretation is described in Section III.C, below.
Considering the clarity of the statutory language and the holdings of ten
of the move-out cases decided to date, it should be apparent that the an-
timodification provision is unambiguous with respect to debtors who
moved out of their principal residences in good faith prior to bankruptcy.
These debtors are entitled to modify their mortgages.
2. The Different-Collateral Cases
Courts have considered a similar timing issue in applying the an-
timodification provisions to different-collateral cases. In these cases, the col-
lateral changed between the time of the mortgage contract and the time of
bankruptcy. To decide whether the mortgage claim was “a claim secured
82. In re Smart, 214 B.R. at 67–68.
83. Id. at 67 (emphasis omitted).
84. Id. (emphasis omitted).
85. The facts of Smart were extreme in one respect that might have justified the result
that the court reached. The Smarts’ mortgage was held by the Connecticut Housing Finance
Authority, and the Authority had the right to declare mortgage debt immediately due and
payable if the Smarts ceased to occupy the property as their principal residence. Id. at 64–65.
The court did not, however, present a legal theory under which these facts would justify the
result.
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only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor’s principal resi-
dence,”86 a court first had to decide whether principal residence status was
necessary at the time of the mortgage transaction or the bankruptcy filing.
The issue in a different-collateral case is not whether a house was a
debtor’s principal residence at whatever time the court considered appropri-
ate for testing. The house was the debtor’s principal residence. The issue is
instead whether the claim was secured only by the debtor’s principal resi-
dence at that time. Nonetheless, courts in different-collateral cases interpret
the same antimodification provisions to determine whether the statutory
language speaks of principal residence as of the bankruptcy or as of some
earlier time. In nine of ten different-collateral cases, the courts have held
that it speaks as of the time of bankruptcy.87
The lone exception, In re Hildebran,88 was one of the first cases to con-
strue the antimodification provisions. The court ruled in favor of the debtor
on highly sympathetic facts. The collateral was business property at the time
of the mortgage transaction, and the debtors were mere guarantors.89 By
coincidence, the property later became their principal residence.90 In decid-
ing the case, the court went straight to the legislative history without first
finding the necessary ambiguity in the language of the statute91 and, like
numerous other courts, misinterpreted that history.
86. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2).
87. In re Austin, No. 11-412191, 2012 WL 1372212, at *2 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. Apr. 19,
2012); In re Baker, 398 B.R. 198, 203 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2008); In re Leigh, 307 B.R. 324, 331
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2004); In re Donahue, 221 B.R. 105, 111 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1998), amended by
231 B.R. 865 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1998), rev’d sub nom. Tatko v. Donahue (In re Donahue), 232 B.R.
610 (D. Vt. 1999); In re Howard, 220 B.R. 716, 718 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1998); In re French, 174
B.R. 1, 7 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994); In re Boisvert, 156 B.R. 357, 359 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1993); In re
Amerson, 143 B.R. 413, 416 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1992); S. Discount Co. of N.C. v. Ivey (In re
Ivey), 13 B.R. 27, 29 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1981).
88. 54 B.R. 585 (Bankr. D. Ore. 1985).
89. Id. at 585.
90. Id. at 586.
91. Id.
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Eleven other courts have weighed in on the timing issue in different-
collateral cases even though the cases did not present the issue. (In each, the
collateral was the same at the time of the mortgage transaction and at bank-
ruptcy.) Seven of these courts said that the collateral’s nature should be
tested as of the time of bankruptcy.92 Four said that it should be tested as of
the time of the mortgage transaction.93
In re Scarborough is the most important of the cases in the latter group
because the dicta are from a federal court of appeals. The facts of Scarbor-
ough presented no timing issue. At all relevant times, the mortgage in Scar-
borough encumbered “a multi-unit dwelling . . . with one apartment on the
first floor and one apartment on the second floor.”94 The Scarborough court
concluded that the antimodification provision did not bar modification of
the mortgage because the mortgage secured not only the principal residence
but also a rental unit that was not the debtor’s principal residence.95 The
92. In re Wages, 479 B.R. 575 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2012); Parker v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg.
Corp., 179 B.R. 492 (E.D. La. 1995), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Parker v. Fed. Home
Loan Mortg. Corp. (In re Parker), 70 F.3d 1269 (5th Cir. 1995); In re Graham, 144 B.R. 80
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1992); In re Dinsmore, 141 B.R. 499 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1992); In re Groff,
131 B.R. 703 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1991); Dent v. Assocs. Equity Servs. Co. (In re Dent), 130 B.R.
623 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1991); In re Green, 7 B.R. 8 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980).
93. Scarborough v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp. (In re Scarborough), 461 F.3d 406,
412 (3d Cir. 2004); In re Moore, 441 B.R. 732, 741 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Bulson, 327
B.R. 830, 845 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2005); In re Guilbert, 176 B.R. 302, 304 (D.R.I. 1995).
94. In re Scarborough, 461 F.3d at 409.
95. Id. at 414.
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court addressed the timing issue only to deflect a potential objection that its
holding would be subject to debtor manipulation:
One objection to this reading of § 1322(b)(2) is that “a debtor could easily
sidestep the . . . home mortgage exception by adding a second living unit to
the property on the eve of the commencement of his Chapter 13 proceed-
ing.” However, for purposes of § 1322(b)(2), the critical moment is when
the creditor takes a security interest in the collateral. “It is at that point in
time that the underwriting decision is made and it is therefore at that point
in time that the lender must know whether the loan it is making may be
subject to modification in a Chapter 13 proceeding at some later date.”96
The above passage constitutes the entire discussion of timing in Scarborough.
The passage asserts that the lender must know whether the loan it is making
is subject to modification at the time of underwriting, but it does not even
attempt to explain why that need should, or how it could, trump the plain
meaning of the statute.
To support this reasoning, Scarborough cites two lower court opinions in
which the courts had employed the same gambit.97 As in Scarborough itself,
neither of the lower court cases cited in the Scarborough excerpt presented
the timing issue. In both, the courts mentioned timing only to assert that the
rule they adopted would not be subject to debtor manipulation.98 Neither
court said more than the above passage from Scarborough, and neither cited
any authority for its assertions.
In re Moore99 was the fourth case in which a court said the status of the
collateral should be determined as of the time of the mortgage. Moore arose
after Scarborough. Although the facts of Moore presented no timing issue,
the court quoted the single sentence in which Scarborough presented its tim-
ing test.100 Thus, in none of the four cases saying that the status of collateral
should be determined as of the time of the mortgage did the court have a
timing issue before it or give significant attention to timing. In all four cases,
the courts’ statements regarding timing were pure dicta.
Thus, the overwhelming weight of authority is that, to determine
whether the antimodification provision applies, a court should examine the
96. Id. at 412 (citations omitted) (quoting In re Bulson, 327 B.R. at 846).
97. Id.
98. In re Bulson, 327 B.R. at 846 (“Countrywide argues that a debtor could easily side-
step the Section 1322(b)(2) home mortgage exception by adding a second living unit to the
property on the eve of the commencement of his Chapter 13 proceeding. However, the defini-
tion I adopt refers to the status of the debtor’s property when the mortgage loan is made.”); In
re Guilbert, 176 B.R. at 305 (“[I]f [a principal residence that is also used to house other tenants
is modifiable], homeowners poised to file for protection under Chapter 13 would, as a matter
of course, seek temporary tenants prior to their filing, in order to modify the rights that their
secured creditors have in their home.”).
99. 441 B.R. 732 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2010).
100. In re Moore, 441 B.R. at 741 (“[T]he relevant time period is necessarily when the
creditor takes a security interest in the real property in question, and the Court must, there-
fore, ‘look to the character of the collateral at the time of the mortgage transaction.’ ” (quoting
In re Scarborough, 461 F.3d at 412)).
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debtor’s use of the collateral at the time of the bankruptcy case. If the debtor
is not using the house as a principal residence at that time, the debtor is
entitled to modify the mortgage.
C. Good Faith
The good-faith requirement of Chapter 13 is found in two provisions of
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a). Paragraph (3) requires that “the plan has been pro-
posed in good faith,” and paragraph (7) requires that “the action of the
debtor in filing the petition was in good faith.”101
Courts use a “totality of circumstances” test to determine good faith.102
The test requires that a court weigh several factors.103 The circuits employ
different lists of factors, and the factor descriptions are vague. Even within
circuits, there is little consistency across cases. Judges’ moral judgments
often appear to be the determinative factor.
In two cases, courts have commented in dicta on the possibility of a
debtor moving out of a house to render the mortgage subject to strip-down.
In both cases, the judges mentioned good faith in reacting negatively to the
idea of move-out as a deliberate debtor strategy. The Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel (“BAP”)’s opinion in Abdelgadir quoted the bankruptcy judge as stat-
ing during a hearing that “[g]ood faith is always an issue . . . if, for example,
somebody, you know, had a piece of property, and they moved out, and
then it was obvious they’re going to move back the next month, that raises
an issue of good faith.”104 The BAP expressed no opinion about the quota-
tion.105 In In re Putnam, the bankruptcy court commented that “[t]his does
not mean, of course, that a debtor can move out of his home the day before
bankruptcy and then modify his home loan; such manipulation and trickery
would be evidence of bad faith which might render a plan unconfirmable
pursuant to § 1129(a)(3) of the Code.”106 Although neither of these reac-
tions has any precedential value, together they suggest that some judges’
initial reactions to the move-out strategy will be negative.
Those negative reactions, however, conflict with two good-faith princi-
ples. First, residential borrowers should not be “mulcted for lack of ‘good
faith’ ” simply for exercising their contract rights.107 Second, so long as a
101. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2012).
102. See, e.g., Drummond v. Welsh (In re Welsh), 465 B.R. 843, 851 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
2012), aff’d, 711 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2013) (Chapter 13 case); Condon v. Brady (In re Con-
don), 358 B.R. 317 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2007) (Chapter 13 case).
103. E.g., Berliner v. Pappalardo (In re Puffer), 674 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2012) (“We
believe that the totality of the circumstances approach to adjudicating good faith should apply
equally to inquiries under section 1325.”).
104. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP v. Abdelgadir (In re Abdelgadir), 455 B.R. 896,
900 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
105. See id.
106. No. 10-14079, 2011 WL 5839692, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2011).
107. Kham & Nate’s Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357
(7th Cir. 1990).
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debtor acts within the debtor’s legal rights, there is “nothing sinister”108 in a
debtor’s arranging the debtor’s affairs to maximize the property the debtor
may retain in bankruptcy.
1. The Contractual Right to Move
Many, if not most, residential first mortgages prohibit the borrower
from moving out of the mortgaged house for a period of one year. For
example, the relevant provision of the Fannie Mae–Freddie Mac Uniform
Instrument Form for California deeds of trust provides as follows:
6. Occupancy. Borrower shall occupy, establish, and use the Property as
Borrower’s principal residence within 60 days after the execution of this
Security Instrument and shall continue to occupy the Property as Bor-
rower’s principal residence for at least one year after the date of occupancy,
unless Lender otherwise agrees in writing, which consent shall not be un-
reasonably withheld, or unless extenuating circumstances exist which are
beyond Borrower’s control.109
Implicit in such a prohibition is a borrower’s right to move out after one
year. The debtor who moves out after fulfilling the contractual obligation to
remain for at least one year is not acting in bad faith but merely exercising a
right provided under the contract. As Circuit Judge Easterbrook famously
stated in Kham & Nate’s Shoes, “[P]rinciples of good faith . . . do not block
use of terms that actually appear in the contract.”110 The court elaborated,
Debtor submits that conduct may be “unfair” and “inequitable” . . . even
though the creditor complies with all contractual requirements, but we are
not willing to embrace a rule that requires participants in commercial
transactions not only to keep their contracts but also do “more”—just how
much more resting in the discretion of a bankruptcy judge assessing the
situation years later. Contracts specify the duties of the parties to each
other, and each may exercise the privileges it obtained.111
108. Judge Learned Hand famously stated the following with respect to tax planning:
“Over and over again courts have said that there is nothing sinister in so arranging one’s affairs
as to keep taxes as low as possible. Everybody does so, rich or poor; and all do right, for
nobody owes any public duty to pay more than the law demands.” Comm’r v. Newman, 159
F.2d 848, 850–51 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J., dissenting). Hand also proclaimed, “Any one may
so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that
pattern which will best pay the Treasury, there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one’s
taxes.” Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), aff’d, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
109. Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac, Uniform Instrument Form 3005: California
Deed of Trust 7–8 (2001) [hereinafter Deed of Trust], available at https://www.fanniemae.
com/content/legal_form/3005w.doc. Substantially the same provision appears in the American
Jurisprudence uniform covenants for national use in residential mortgages. 13 Am. Jur. Legal
Forms 2d Mortgages and Trust Deeds § 179:37, sec. 6 (“Borrower shall occupy, establish, and
use the property as borrower’s principal residence within [number of days] days after the exe-
cution of this security instrument and shall continue to occupy the property as borrower’s
principal residence for at least one year after the date of occupancy . . . .”).
110. Kham & Nate’s Shoes, 908 F.2d at 1357.
111. Id. at 1356.
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In the case of a residential mortgage, a court should also reach this re-
sult in the absence of an express provision regarding the required term of
occupancy. Residential mortgages are contracts of adhesion, drafted by lend-
ers. Lenders and borrowers who wish to contract for continued occupancy
throughout the term of the mortgage are entitled to do so and in some cases
actually do so. In Smart, for example,
the Debtors “covenant[ed] and agree[d] that . . . [the mortgage holder]
may declare all sums secured by the Mortgage to be immediately due and
payable upon the occurrence of any of the following”, inter alia: . . . (2) the
Debtors do not make the Property their principal residence within sixty
(60) days of the closing, and continue to occupy the Property as their prin-
cipal residence “throughout the term of the Mortgage.”112
When a borrower has not contracted to continue occupancy, a court should
interpret the silence as recognizing the borrower’s right to move out of the
property and rent it. The borrower’s implied contractual right to move
should be dispositive of a lender’s claim that moving is bad faith—not the
other way around.
2. The Statutory Right to Move
Generally speaking, debtors have the right to arrange their affairs during
the prefiling period in a manner that will benefit them postfiling.113 They
can buy and sell property, incur and pay debts, move from state to state,
change their residences, and change how they use their property. For exam-
ple, debtors who own property that would not have been exempt in bank-
ruptcy may exchange that property for property that will be exempt.
Bankruptcy law places a variety of limits on bankruptcy planning. The
principal limit is fraudulent transfer law. Debtors may not transfer property
with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud their creditors.114 Bank-
ruptcy law does not assume that debtors make transfers for the purpose of
harming creditors merely because the transfers do harm creditors and bene-
fit the debtors.115 This is how the House Judiciary Committee described a
debtor’s right to plan for bankruptcy in 1977: “As under current law, the
112. In re Smart, 214 B.R. 63, 64–65 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1997) (first and second altera-
tions in original).
113. 2 Raymond T. Nimmer et al., Nimmer’s Commercial Asset-Based Financing
§ 12:3 (rev. ed. 2013) (“As a first premise, the debtor is ordinarily permitted to transfer, sell,
and use its own property prior to filing in whatever way it sees fit and to its own advantage.
The competing theme is that acts of fraud or misrepresentations, pure concealment, or breach
of fiduciary duty cannot occur without risk of some sanction or lost benefit in bankruptcy.”).
114. E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A) (2012).
115. Norwest Bank Neb., N.A. v. Tveten, 848 F.2d 871, 873–74 (8th Cir. 1988) (“It is
well established that under the Code the conversion of non-exempt to exempt property for the
purpose of placing the property out of the reach of creditors, without more, will not deprive
the debtor of the exemption to which he otherwise would be entitled.”); see also Lynn M.
LoPucki, A General Theory of the Dynamics of the State Remedies/Bankruptcy System, 1982 Wis.
L. Rev. 311, 333–38 (1982) (discussing bankruptcy planning).
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debtor will be permitted to convert nonexempt property into exempt prop-
erty before filing a bankruptcy petition. The practice is not fraudulent as to
creditors, and permits the debtor to make full use of the exemptions to
which he is entitled under the law.”116 In the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”),117 Congress placed sev-
eral new limits on bankruptcy exemption planning but left “the other types
of [bankruptcy] planning untouched.”118 Debtors continue to have the right
to engage in legitimate bankruptcy planning, and that planning does not
demonstrate lack of good faith.119
Borrowers who employ this Article’s recommendations will move out of
their homes prior to filing bankruptcy in order to entitle themselves to strip
down their mortgages after filing. The most closely analogous post-BAPCPA
cases are those in which debtors have dismissed Chapter 13 cases filed less
than 910 days after financing a car and then refiled more than 910 days after
financing the car to allow themselves to strip down the car loan.120 In both
scenarios, the Chapter 13 debtor deliberately alters the debtor’s situation
prior to filing to become eligible for an advantage against a secured creditor
after filing.
For example, in In re Robinson the debtor filed bankruptcy only after she
and her attorney thought that the 910-day period had run.121 They miscalcu-
lated the time period and inadvertently filed on the 904th day.122 Realizing
her mistake, the debtor dismissed and refiled her case after the 910-day pe-
riod had run.123 The court applied the totality of circumstances test to hold
that the second Chapter 13 case was filed in good faith. The court stated,
There is absolutely no evidence that Debtor here had any intent to defraud
anyone, so her decision to either wait until the 911th day after buying a car
to file, or, having miscalculated the days, dismissing and refiling soon
thereafter to take advantage of the 910-day exception, is legitimate pre-
bankruptcy planning.124
116. H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 361 (1977) (citation omitted).
117. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11
U.S.C. (2012)).
118. Juliet M. Moringiello, Has Congress Slimmed down the Hogs?: A Look at the
BAPCPA Approach to Pre-bankruptcy Planning, 15 Widener L.J. 615, 629 (2006).
119. E.g., In re Robinson, No. 07-41562-13, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 1569, *21–22 (Bankr. D.
Kan. May 16, 2008) (“[A] debtor may legitimately engage in pre-bankruptcy planning so long
as there is no intent to defraud creditors.”).
120. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2012).
121. In re Robinson, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 1569, at *2.
122. Id. at *3 (“Only when Chrysler Financial objected to confirmation of Debtor’s plan
did she apparently realize that either she or her attorney had miscounted the number of days
between purchase and filing, and that she had actually filed five days too soon to take advan-
tage of the 910-day provision . . . .”).
123. Id. at *3–4.
124. Id. at *22.
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In re Murphy provides a second example.125 The debtor in Murphy filed
his first Chapter 13 proceeding less than 910 days after the loan and pro-
posed to strip down the amount of the loan to the value of the collateral.126
The judge assigned to the case had a reputation for not permitting strip-
down in that circumstance.127 The debtor initially responded by amending
his plan to pay the car loan in full.128 He made four months of payments,
dismissed the case, waited a little over one month, and then filed a second
Chapter 13 case on the 915th day after obtaining the car loan.129 The lender
again objected. The court held that the debtor had not filed the second case
in bad faith and that the debtor was entitled to strip down the car loan.130
Moving out is weaker evidence of bad faith than is dismissing and refil-
ing. Moving out is an economically significant act that requires considerable
sacrifice on the part of the debtor. Dismissing and refiling is purely a legal
gambit with little or no impact on a debtor’s life. Courts should therefore be
more willing to accept that a debtor moves out in good faith than that a
debtor dismisses and refiles in good faith.
Moving out renders the mortgage eligible for strip-down.131 That the
debtor’s purpose in moving was to become eligible is not an indication of
bad faith. The debtor is merely exercising rights under the mortgage con-
tract and the Bankruptcy Code. Congress could have excluded from modifi-
cation any mortgage secured by real property that was the debtor’s principal
residence at the time the debtor granted the mortgage. Instead, it excluded
any mortgage secured by real property that was the debtor’s principal resi-
dence at the time the debtor filed bankruptcy. The plain meaning of the
provision is that the mortgage is not excluded from modification if the
debtor ceases to use the real property as the debtor’s principal residence
prior to bankruptcy. That meaning is not inconsistent with Congress’s ap-
parent intention to protect home lenders against mortgage modification. In-
stead, the language Congress chose provides a safety valve for debtors whose
need for modification is so great that they are willing to move out of their
homes prior to bankruptcy.
Even though a move-out to create eligibility to strip down a mortgage is
not alone bad faith, it can occur in conjunction with other conduct that
does demonstrate bad faith. An example might be a move-out by a debtor
125. 375 B.R. 919 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2007).
126. In re Murphy, 375 B.R. at 920–21 (“During the 2006 Chapter 13 case, CAF undis-
putedly held what is commonly called a 910 claim—a purchase money security interest, for a
debt incurred during the 910 days prior to the bankruptcy filing, secured by a motor vehicle
purchased for the personal use of the debtor.”).
127. See id. at 921 (“Because Chief Judge Hershner and I follow different interpretations
of the hanging paragraph with respect to 910 claims, counsel initially filed a plan proposing a
cram down . . . and later amended the plan to treat CAF’s claim as fully secured after Judge
Hershner was assigned to the case.”).
128. Id. at 920.
129. Id. at 921.
130. Id. at 923.
131. See supra Section II.B.1.
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who obtained the mortgage in exchange for a promise to personally occupy
the house as her principal residence for the mortgage term. In addition,
some debtors who move out of their homes prior to bankruptcy in good
faith may nevertheless file their bankruptcy cases or propose their plans in
bad faith for unrelated reasons.
III. Legislative History
Most arguments against home mortgage modification rely in whole or
in part on legislative history. These arguments’ core assertion is that the
legislative history shows that Congress made all principal residence mort-
gages unmodifiable to attract capital to the home mortgage market. This
Part makes three points regarding those arguments.
First, the language of the antimodification provision is unambiguous
with respect to timing, and a large majority of courts addressing the issue
have so held.132 If the collateral is not a debtor’s principal residence at the
time of the bankruptcy case, the antimodification provision does not apply
and the debtor is entitled to modify the mortgage. Because the statute is
unambiguous, courts should not consult legislative history. Thus the history
is irrelevant.
Second, as others have pointed out, the claimed legislative history does
not exist.133 Neither Congress nor any member or agent of Congress made
any statement linking the antimodification provision to the attraction of
capital.
Third, instead of inferring congressional intent from legislative history,
some courts and commentators have sought to infer congressional intent
from the statute itself. But the courts that have used this method have ig-
nored possible congressional purposes other than attracting capital. I discuss
each of these three points separately.
A. Irrelevance
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that “when the statute’s lan-
guage is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the disposition
132. See supra Section II.B.
133. Julia Patterson Forrester, Mortgaging the American Dream: A Critical Evaluation of
the Federal Government’s Promotion of Home Equity Financing, 69 Tul. L. Rev. 373, 424–25
(1994) (“[T]here is no explicit legislative history on point . . . .”); Gary Klein, Legislative Intent
or Judicial Myth-Making?: No Legislative History Supports Policy Arguments Advanced Against
Stripdown, Am. Bankr. Inst. J., Dec.–Jan. 2000, at 1, 30 (“In short, despite Justice Stevens’s
concurrence, there is no valid legislative history that supports policy-based limits on the plain
language of § 1322(b)(2).”); Levitin, supra note 18, at 573–75 (“Justice Stevens’s assertion has
scant support in the legislative history, but has nonetheless become the dominant explanation
for the Bankruptcy Code’s mortgage antimodification provision.” (footnote omitted));
Michael S. Polk, The Chapter 13 Cramdown: New Nightmare for the Lender, 19 Real Est. L.J.
279, 290 (1991) (“[T]o a large degree the legislative history of Section 1322(b)(2) is silent
. . . .”).
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required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.”134
Resorting to legislative history is unnecessary when the statutory text is
clear.135
The Bankruptcy Code provision at issue here is unambiguous. The
Ninth Circuit BAP said precisely that in Abdelgadir:
Reliance on legislative history is unnecessary when the statute’s language is
unambiguous. The plain language of § 1123(b)(5) excepts a particular type
of claim from modification. As discussed above, a creditor’s right to pay-
ment, whether it later is deemed secured or unsecured depending on the
value of the collateral, is fixed at the petition date. Therefore, our statutory
analysis leads us to conclude that the determinative date for whether a
claim is secured by a debtor’s principal residence is, like all claims, fixed at
the petition date.136
As previously noted, the Smart court proposed an alternative reading of the
antimodification provisions. The alternative reading, however, is grammati-
cally incorrect, so it does not identify an ambiguity.137
Although the antimodification provisions may be ambiguous in other
respects, they are not ambiguous with respect to the timing problem.
Resorting to legislative history is therefore contrary to the law.
B. Nonexistence
The preference for literal interpretation of statutes results in large part
from the limitations of legislative history. Justice Scalia, no fan of legislative
history, explained some of its shortcomings in Milavetz:
The Court first notes that statements in the Report of the House Commit-
tee on the Judiciary “indicate concern with abusive practices undertaken by
attorneys.” Perhaps, but only the concern of the author of the Report. Such
statements tell us nothing about what the statute means, since (1) we do
not know that the members of the Committee read the Report, (2) it is
almost certain that they did not vote on the Report (that is not the prac-
tice), and (3) even if they did read and vote on it, they were not, after all,
those who made this law. The statute before us is a law because its text was
approved by a majority vote of the House and the Senate, and was signed
by the President. Even indulging the extravagant assumption that Members
of the House other than members of its Committee on the Judiciary read
the Report (and the further extravagant assumption that they agreed with
134. Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins.
Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted);
accord Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997) (quoting United States v. Ron Pair
Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240 (1989)).
135. E.g., Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 236 n.3
(2010) (“[R]eliance on legislative history is unnecessary in light of the statute’s unambiguous
language . . . .”).
136. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP v. Abdelgadir (In re Abdelgadir), 455 B.R. 896,
903 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 82–84.
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it), the Members of the Senate could not possibly have read it, since it did
not exist when the Senate passed the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005. And the President surely had more im-
portant things to do.138
The limitations of legislative history with respect to the antimodification
provisions are even greater because what probative legislative history exists
with respect to home mortgage modification consists entirely of testimony
to Congress rather than statements made on behalf of Congress.139
Even if mere testimony constituted legislative history and resorting to it
were appropriate, the testimony is silent with respect to the timing issue.
Congress enacted the Chapter 13 antimodification language in 1978, and
that language has remained unchanged since then. Because the “principal
residence” language was added to the bill late in the legislative process, no
one testified about it.140 Except for a paraphrase of its language,141 the provi-
sion does not appear in the House or Senate reports.142 Nor were the floor
statements in either chamber at all enlightening.143
138. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 253 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
139. Nobelman contained no direct citation to legislative history. In his concurring
opinion, Justice Stevens cited Grubbs v. Houston First American Savings Ass’n, 730 F.2d 236,
245–46 (5th Cir. 1984). Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 332 (1993) (Stevens, J.,
concurring). The Grubbs pages Stevens cited contain references to the statements of three
witnesses who testified before the Subcommittee on Improvements of the Judicial Machinery
of the Senate Committee on Judiciary. See Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 245 & n.13. The cited pages
contain only one reference to the committee report. Id. at 245 n.15. Grubbs quoted the report
in full. The report did nothing more than track the language of section 1322(b). The only
other reference to legislative history in Grubbs was a reference to floor statements explaining
the last-minute amendment to subsection 1322(b)(2). Grubbs set forth the floor statements in
full. The floor statements said that the subsection is a compromise, tracked the language of the
antimodification provision, and ended by stating, “It is intended that a claim secured by the
debtor’s principal residence may be treated with under [sic] section 1322(b)(5) of the House
amendment.” Id. at 246 n.16 (internal quotation marks omitted). None of this history ex-
plained the intent of the antimodification provision or addressed the timing issue.
140. Senate Bill 2266, 95th Cong. (1977) was the subject of the last hearing held on the
topic. See Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 245 & n.13 (noting that Senate Bill 2266 was introduced after the
1975 hearings but before the 1977 hearings). The version of subsection 1322(b)(2) of the
Bankruptcy Code contained in the bill read that the plan may “modify the rights of holders of
secured claims (other than claims wholly secured by mortgages on real property) or of holders
of unsecured claims.” Id. at 245 n.14 (emphasis omitted).
141. See id. at 245 n.15 (quoting the Senate Report statement “in full”).
142. S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 141 (1978).
143. Grubbs stated,
The floor-statements explaining these amendments are as follows: “Section 1322(b)(2) of
the House amendment represents a compromise agreement between similar provisions in
the House bill and Senate amendment. Under the House amendment, the plan may
modify the rights of holders of secured claims other than a claim secured by a security
interest in real property that is the debtor’s principal residence. It is intended that a claim
secured by the debtor’s principal residence may be treated with under [sic] section
1322(b)(5) of the House amendment. 124 Cong.Rec.H. 11,106 (Sept. 28, 1978); S 17,243
(Oct. 6, 1978).”
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Congress added the antimodification language in Chapter 11 in 1994 to
provide the same treatment for principal residence mortgages in Chapter 11
that Congress provided in Chapter 13. That history states only as follows:
This amendment conforms the treatment of residential mortgages in chap-
ter 11 to that in chapter 13, preventing the modification of the rights of a
holder of a claim secured only by a security interest in the debtor’s princi-
pal residence. . . . [The added antimodification language] does not apply to
a commercial property, or to any transaction in which the creditor ac-
quired a lien on property other than real property used as the debtor’s
residence.144
A footnote at the end of that text cites two cases, Hammond v. Common-
wealth Mortgage Co. of America (In re Hammond)145 and In re Ramirez.146
Neither case raised the timing issue, and neither court said anything about
it. As a result, no legislative history exists with regard to the timing issue.
Some courts have, nevertheless, purported to rely on legislative history
in resolving the timing issue.147 The source of their error is almost invariably
Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion in Nobelman. This is the entire opinion:
At first blush it seems somewhat strange that the Bankruptcy Code should
provide less protection to an individual’s interest in retaining possession of
his or her home than of other assets. The anomaly is, however, explained
by the legislative history indicating that favorable treatment of residential
mortgagees was intended to encourage the flow of capital into the home
lending market. See Grubbs v. Houston First American Savings Assn., 730
F.2d 236, 245–46 (CA5 1984) (canvassing legislative history of Chapter 13
home mortgage provisions). It therefore seems quite clear that the Court’s
literal reading of the text of the statute is faithful to the intent of Congress.
Accordingly, I join its opinion and judgment.148
As previously noted, the Grubbs pages that Stevens cited reference no state-
ment by the House, the Senate, any committee of Congress, or any member
of Congress regarding the antimodification provision.
Grubbs made no claim to the contrary. Grubbs merely speculated—in a
single sentence—as to what might have persuaded Congress to adopt the
language it did: “[The antimodification provision] was apparently in re-
sponse to perceptions, or to suggestions advanced in the legislative hearings,
that, home mortgagor lenders, performing a valuable social service through
730 F.2d at 246 n.16.
144. H.R. Rep. No. 103-835, at 46 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3354.
145. 27 F.3d 52 (3d Cir. 1994).
146. 62 B.R. 668 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1986).
147. E.g., In re Bulson, 327 B.R. 830, 846 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2005) (establishing in
dicta a “temporal” rule that the “status of the debtor’s property when the mortgage loan is
made” is controlling to achieve “Congress’ purpose in enacting the home mortgage excep-
tion”); In re Smart, 214 B.R. 63, 68 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1997) (“Reading Section 1322(b)(2) to
refer to a property’s status at the time of the creation of the subject security interest is consis-
tent with, and wholly supportive of, Congress’ ‘flow of capital’ purpose.”).
148. Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 332 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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their loans, needed special protection against modification thereof (i.e., re-
ducing installment payments, secured valuations, etc.).”149 Thus, Stevens’s
claim is not based on legislative history but rather on his and the Grubbs
court’s speculation about what Congress’s purpose might have been.150
C. Legislative Purpose
The case law and commentary is rife with speculation regarding Con-
gress’s purpose. For example, shortly after the effective date of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, Bankruptcy Judge Saul wrote in United Cos. Financial Corp. v.
Brantley,
Although the legislative history is silent, the plain intent of the exception is
to provide stability in the residential long-term home financing industry
and market. It is to specifically protect institutional lenders engaged only in
providing long-term home mortgage financing and not lenders primarily
engaged in consumer or other areas of financing but who take security
interests in a residence or homestead to secure non-home financing
debts.151
In this passage, the court was not using legislative history to determine
the meaning of the statute. The court acknowledged that there is no legisla-
tive history. Instead, the court determined the legislative purpose from the
statute’s face and then interpreted the statute to achieve that legislative pur-
pose. This technique is tautological. The only purpose that can be gleaned
from a statute’s face is to achieve the consequences that would follow from
literal application of the statute.
In quick succession, two other cases cited Brantley and embellished their
account of Congress’s intention—without examining legislative history.152
149. Grubbs v. Hous. First Am. Sav. Ass’n, 730 F.2d 236, 246 (5th Cir. 1984) (citation
omitted).
150. See, e.g., Levitin, supra note 18, at 573–75 (“Justice Stevens’s assertion has scant
support in the legislative history, but has nonetheless become the dominant explanation for
the Bankruptcy Code’s mortgage antimodification provision.” (footnote omitted)). Stevens
ignored the Second Circuit, which has previously refused to speculate about congressional
intent:
The legislative history therefore indicates only that § 1322(b)(2) was designed to provide
greater protection to home mortgage lenders than other secured creditors in the Chapter
13 context. This is, of course, plain on the face of the statute itself. No further guidance
may be gleaned from the legislative history on the question presented here: the extent to
which such creditors are to be accorded greater protection, i.e., whether modification
includes bifurcation.
Bellamy v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. (In re Bellamy), 962 F.2d 176, 182 (2d Cir. 1992),
abrogated by Nobelman, 508 U.S. 324.
151. 6 B.R. 178, 189 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1980).
152. In re Morphis, 30 B.R. 589, 593 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983) (quoting the above pas-
sage from Brantley and adding that “[a]lthough the statute is not limited to lenders engaged
only in home financing it is intended to specifically apply to actual, long-term home financing
loans, regardless of the lender”); In re Neal, 10 B.R. 535, 536–37 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981)
(referring to the legislative history as “sparse” but continuing, “There apparently was a fear on
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Later, courts began to claim that there was legislative history, and a dispute
developed over whether that history limited protection to the “traditional
mortgage lenders” or included the holders of subordinate and short-term
mortgages against debtors’ principal residences.153 These inferences quickly
gave rise to a myth that legislative history revealed a congressional intent to
encourage the flow of capital into the home lending market. As reflected in
this passage, the myth was full blown by 1985:
[T]he statute as finally enacted by Congress clearly evidences a concern
with the possible effects the new bankruptcy act might have upon the mar-
ket for homes. If any other policy objective of Congress was adequate to
compete against the objective of protecting wage earners generally, it was a
policy to encourage the increased production of homes and to encourage
private individual ownership of homes as a traditional and important value
in American life. Congress had to face the reality that in a relatively free
society, market forces and the profit motive play a vital role in determining
how investment capital will be employed. Every protection Congress might
grant a homeowner at the expense of the holders of security interests on
those homes would decrease the attractiveness of home mortgages as in-
vestment opportunities. And as home mortgages decrease in attractiveness,
the pool of money available for new home construction and finance
shrinks.154
That myth grew increasingly influential over time, ultimately leading to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Nobelman.
Congress may have intended for the antimodification provision to bene-
fit home lenders and encourage home mortgage lending. But the antimodifi-
cation provision would have accomplished both of these goals regardless of
the outcome in Nobelman and regardless of how the timing issue was re-
solved. The difference Nobelman made was in the extent to which the an-
timodification provision would benefit lenders and attract capital. The
logical fallacy is that if Congress intended to benefit lenders and attract capi-
tal, it intended only to benefit lenders and attract capital.155
the part of the drafters of the legislation . . . of a wholesale revision of the repayment terms of
home mortgages to the substantial financial detriment of the lending institutions”).
153. Compare 1st 2nd Mortg. Co. of NJ, Inc. v. Ferandos (In re Ferandos), 402 F.3d 147,
151 (3d Cir. 2005) (“This court concurs with the cases that hold that the true congressional
intent behind the Section 1322(b)(2) exception for claims secured only by an interest in the
debtor’s principal residence is to protect the traditional mortgage lender who provides long-
term financing that enables individuals to purchase their home . . . .” (quoting In re Williams,
109 B.R. 36, 42 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted)), with Allied
Credit Corp. v. Davis (In re Davis), 989 F.2d 208, 210 (6th Cir. 1993) (“As noted by the courts
below, the language of § 1322(b)(2) is clear and unambiguous on its face and does not permit
the interpretation that the statute has application only to ‘enabling’ loans.”).
154. Fed. Land Bank of Louisville v. Glenn (In re Glenn), 760 F.2d 1428, 1434 (6th Cir.
1985).
155. The fallacy is apparent in Smart, where the court first concluded that “favorable
statutory treatment of homestead mortgagees was intended to encourage and sustain a flow of
affordable capital into the home lending market” and then construed “Section 1322(b)(2) so
as to give maximum effect to the intentions of Congress” without first determining whether
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But there are alternative explanations for the language Congress chose.
Each assumes that Congress intended to benefit home mortgage lenders and
thereby attract capital to the home mortgage market. Each also explains why
Congress limited that benefit to cases in which a debtor continued to occupy
the home at the time of bankruptcy instead of extending it to all home
mortgage cases.
One such alternative conclusion is that, in addition to attracting capital
to the home mortgage market, Congress also sought to preserve the ability
of bankruptcy courts to provide relief based on conditions at the time of
bankruptcy. The latter is a strong policy that pervades the provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code.156 The reason for this strong, pervasive policy is that
bankruptcy relief is designed to rehabilitate honest debtors and enable them
to resume productive lives. If contracts entered into years before bankruptcy
could limit the availability of relief, rehabilitation might no longer be
possible.
Allowing debtors who move out of their houses to keep them gives
those debtors an advantage over debtors who do not move out. This dis-
crimination may seem unfair. But Congress chose language that suggests an
intent that the policy that favors granting relief based on circumstances at
bankruptcy overrides the policy that favors attracting capital to the housing
market. Discrimination based narrowly on circumstances at filing is com-
mon in bankruptcy because the bankruptcy system seeks to provide relief to
all honest debtors. Debtors who owe large amounts of debt get more relief
than debtors who owe small amounts. Debtors who own more exempt prop-
erty at the time of bankruptcy get a head start over those who own less
exempt property. Debtors whose creditors have given them chance after
chance can discharge their debts just as readily and to the same extent as
debtors whose creditors refused them even a second chance.
Congress’s second possible purpose for granting relief to mortgagors
who move out, while denying it to those who do not, may have been to limit
mortgage modification to those with the greatest need for it. Conditioning
that was Congress’s only relevant intention. See In re Smart, 214 B.R. 63, 68 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1997).
156. The amounts of creditors’ claims are determined as of the filing of the petition, 11
U.S.C. § 502(b) (2012) (“[T]he court . . . shall determine the amount of such claim . . . as of
the date of the filing of the petition . . . .”), the extent to which claims are treated as secured is
determined as of the time of bankruptcy, id. § 506(b) (“[S]uch value with respect to personal
property securing an allowed claim shall be determined based on the replacement value of
such property as of the date of the filing of the petition . . . .”), and what property is exempt in
bankruptcy is determined based on state law as of the filing of the petition, not as of the time
the creditors extended credit, id. § 522(b)(3)(A) (exempting “property that is exempt under
Federal law . . . or State or local law that is applicable on the date of the filing of the petition”).
Numerous other examples exist. To list just a few, the rights that can or cannot be modified
under subsection 1322(b)(2) or cured and paid under subsections 1322(b)(3) and 1322(b)(4)
are determined as of the filing of the petition. So are the transfers that can be set aside as
preferences, id. § 547(b), and the appropriate venue for the filing of a case, 28 U.S.C. § 1408
(2006).
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mortgage modification on moving out would accomplish that purpose be-
cause only those with the greatest need would make the move. If interest
rates on home mortgages were at 6%, those with interest rates of 7% to 8%
would tend not to move out. But those with interest rates of 12% to 18%
would tend to move out. The same kind of separation would occur between
those whose mortgages were only 10% to 20% underwater and those whose
mortgages were 40% or more underwater.157 Perhaps most importantly, it
would occur between those who saw their houses as mere investments and
those with strong emotional attachments to their houses. In short, Congress
may have intended the move-out limitation on the antimodification provi-
sion to act as a safety valve to provide relief in egregious cases.
The third possible purpose may have been to leave the determination of
whether debtors would have the right to move out of their homes and mod-
ify their home mortgages to private contracting and the market. A rule that
flatly prohibited the modification of home mortgages would have prevented
contracting by lenders and borrowers at the time of the mortgage. The terms
of the mortgage would have made no difference. The rule Congress adopted
instead left lenders and borrowers free to contract regarding mortgage mod-
ification. If a mortgage requires that a debtor occupy the home, the debtor
cannot modify the mortgage in a bankruptcy filed during the period of re-
quired occupancy. To render a mortgage permanently nonmodifiable, a
mortgage holder would require that a debtor occupy the home during the
entire time the mortgage remains outstanding. The rule Congress adopted
also left mortgage market regulators free to use, permit, or require particular
mortgage provisions regarding debtors’ rights to move out. Regulators can
use that freedom to determine the level of mortgage modification in the
system as a whole.
The mortgage in Smart is an example of contracting for nonmodifica-
tion. The Smart mortgage was due on move-out.158 Presumably, the lender
and the borrower agreed that the borrower should occupy the house as long
as the mortgage remained outstanding. By contrast, one of the “uniform
covenants” in the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac California single family
mortgage form provides,
Borrower shall occupy, establish, and use the Property as Borrower’s prin-
cipal residence within 60 days after the execution of this Security Instru-
ment and shall continue to occupy the Property as Borrower’s principal
residence for at least one year after the date of occupancy, unless Lender
otherwise agrees in writing, which consent shall not be unreasonably with-
held, or unless extenuating circumstances exist which are beyond Bor-
rower’s control.159
157. See Goodman et al., supra note 6, at 29 (“Across all product types, the loans with
higher mark-to-market CLTVs transition to default at a much higher rate than do loans with
lower mark-to-market CLTVs.” (emphasis omitted)).
158. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
159. Deed of Trust, supra note 109, at 7–8.
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Presumably, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac adopted this term and imposed it
on lenders. The language Congress employed in the antimodification provi-
sions expresses Congress’s apparent intention that such provisions deter-
mine the extent of a debtor’s right to move out and modify.
IV. Plan Confirmability
As discussed in Part II, the house-swap strategy will entitle most debtors
to move out of their houses, file Chapter 13 cases, and modify their home
mortgages. The last step necessary for these debtors to confirm plans is for
them to propose payment schedules for their modified mortgages.
Section 1322(d) of the Bankruptcy Code limits plan payments to a max-
imum period of five years.160 The problem for most debtors will be that they
cannot afford to pay even the reduced amounts of their mortgages over such
a short period.
Debtors may use three types of plans to solve this problem. No single
type is likely to succeed in all jurisdictions. But at least one is likely to suc-
ceed in any given jurisdiction. Debtors should proceed by proposing the
type they consider best for the particular jurisdiction and, if that type fails,
seeking leave to file another type.
A. Modification and Payment Maintenance
A modification and payment maintenance plan solves the problem in
two steps. The plan first provides for modification of the mortgage debt,
pursuant to subsection 1322(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, by reducing the
mortgage debt to the value of the collateral as authorized by section
506(a).161 The plan then provides that the debtor will maintain payments on
the reduced amount during the plan period. “Maintaining payments” means
that each payment during the plan period must be in the amount provided
by the mortgage. The plan cannot provide for the payments that mortgage
requires to be paid after the plan’s five-year period.162
Bankruptcy will not discharge the payments that the mortgage requires
to be paid after the plan’s five-year period.163 Nor will bankruptcy law pro-
tect the debtor from foreclosure after the plan’s five-year period.164 State law,
however, will protect the debtor from foreclosure after the plan period if the
160. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d)(1) (2012) (“[T]he plan may not provide for payments over a
period that is longer than 5 years.”).
161. See infra notes 166–167 and accompanying text.
162. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d).
163. Id. § 1328(a)(1) (“[T]he court shall grant the debtor a discharge of all debts pro-
vide for by the plan . . . except any debt . . . provided for under section 1322(b)(5).”).
164. Upon the grant of the discharge, the permanent injunction of 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)
replaces the automatic stay. But debts provided for under 11 U.S.C. § 322(b)(5) are not dis-
charged. See id. § 1328(a).
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debtor is current on the payments required under the original mortgage
terms.165
The plain language of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes this solution.
Subsection 506(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that “[a]n allowed
claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an
interest . . . is a secured claim to the extent of the value of [the collateral] . . .
and is an unsecured claim to the extent [of the deficiency].”166 Sec-
tion 1322(b) of the Bankruptcy Code further provides that
the plan may . . .
(2) modify the rights of holders of secured claims . . . or of holders of
unsecured claims [and] . . .
. . . .
(5) notwithstanding paragraph (2) of this subsection, provide for the cur-
ing of any default within a reasonable time and maintenance of payments
while the case is pending on any . . . secured claim on which the last pay-
ment is due after the date on which the final payment under the plan is
due.167
Congress’s use of the word “and” to join the subparagraphs of sec-
tion 1322(b) makes clear that a single plan may do the things described in
both subparagraphs. Use of the phrase “notwithstanding paragraph (2)” in
subsection 1322(b)(5) makes clear that a plan may apply both subsections to
the same mortgage debt. That is, a plan may provide for the maintenance of
payments on a secured claim, notwithstanding that the plan is modifying the
claim under subsection 1322(b)(2).
This sound reasoning was rejected by the Ninth Circuit in Enewally v.
Washington Mutual Bank (In re Enewally).168 In that case, the court held that
“a chapter 13 debtor may not invoke both a modification of a secured credi-
tor’s claim under § 1322(b)(2) and the right to ‘cure and maintain’ over the
life of the original loan as authorized under § 1322(b)(5).”169 Although ap-
parently conceding that the bankruptcy court’s opinion, which had allowed
the debtor to invoke both subsections, was the better reading of the statute,
the court felt constrained by the Supreme Court’s opinions in Dewsnup and
Nobelman to adopt what the Ninth Circuit itself considered a worse
reading.170
165. The debtor will be current because the debtor maintained payments during the
case on the secured portion (i.e., the debt “provided for by the plan”) and received a discharge
of the unsecured portion. Id. § 1328(a).
166. Id. § 506(a)(1).
167. Id. § 1322(b).
168. 368 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2004).
169. In re Enewally, 368 F.3d at 1171 (quoting Enewally v. Wash. Mut. Bank (In re
Enewally), 276 B.R. 643, 651 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
170. See id. (“Although the bankruptcy court’s analysis is arguably much closer to the
original vision of the Bankruptcy Code than the district court’s holding, we are not writing on
a clean slate. The Supreme Court has spoken directly in Dewsnup and Nobelman.”).
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To explain why it did not follow the better reading, the Ninth Circuit
began by noting that “Dewsnup cautioned against courts fashioning a ‘broad
new remedy’ under § 506(a) where the remedy was not ‘mentioned some-
where in the Code itself or in the annals of Congress.’ ”171 The court then
continued,
In order to hold that the debtor’s lien stripping proposal is viable under the
“cure and maintain” provision of § 1322(b)(5), we would have to hold that
§ 506(a) coupled with § 1322(b)(5) provides a new remedy allowing modi-
fication of secured debts in Chapter 13 independent of § 1322(b)(2). The
logic of Dewsnup and Nobelman do not permit this construction.172
The first problem with the court’s reasoning is that the remedies invoked in
Enewally—modification under subsection 1322(b)(2) and maintenance of
payments under subsection 1322(b)(5)—are both “mentioned . . . in the
Code itself.”173
The second defect in the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning is that the modifica-
tion of secured debt does not occur “independent of [subsec-
tion] 1322(b)(2).” It occurs pursuant to subsection 1322(b)(2). The debtors
in Enewally sought to apply two subsections of section 1322(b) to the same
mortgage debt. Nothing in the Bankruptcy Code prohibits that application.
As already explained, section 1322(b) authorizes it. There is nothing new
about the application of the two subsections of section 1322(b) to the same
mortgage debt. The authorizing language has been in the Code since 1978,174
and many cases had previously applied the two subsections of sec-
tion 1322(b) to the same debt.175 Speaking of the interpretation later
adopted by the court in Enewally, one court stated in 1998 that “the inter-
pretation . . . flies in the face of the decisions rendered by virtually every
bankruptcy court in the First Circuit that has addressed the question.”176
Third, there is no “logic [in] Dewsnup and Nobelman” that bars the
application of subsections 1322(b)(2) and 1322(b)(5) to the same claim.177
Because the Nobelman mortgage was against a principal residence, the court
had to decide whether the antimodification exception applied. The Court
171. Id. at 1171–72 (quoting Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 420 (1992)).
172. Id. at 1172.
173. Id. (quoting Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 420 (1992)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
174. Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 101, 92 Stat. 2549, 2648–49 (enacting 11
U.S.C. § 1322).
175. E.g., Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Ferreira (In re Ferreira), 223 B.R. 258, 262 (D.R.I.
1998) (“In short, subsections (b)(2) and (b)(5) are not mutually exclusive and a Chapter 13
plan may include a provision for curing default and maintaining payments with respect to the
secured portion of an under-secured claim that has been bifurcated pursuant to subsection
(b)(2) and § 506(a).”); In re Pruett, 178 B.R. 7, 9 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995); In re McGregor, 172
B.R. 718, 719 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994) (allowing a debtor to bifurcate a secured claim and then
maintain payments on the secured portion only), cited in In re Pruett, 178 B.R. at 9.
176. In re Ferreira, 223 B.R. at 262.
177. In re Enewally, 368 F.3d at 1172.
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held that the exception did apply because modification of the unsecured
portion of the mortgage modified the “rights” of the mortgagee.178 Because
the Enewally mortgage was not against a principal residence, the antimodifi-
cation provision did not apply. As a result, the issue decided in Nobelman—
what rights or claims were modifiable—did not matter in Enewally. Subsec-
tion 1322(b)(2) is clear that unless the antimodification exception applies, a
plan can modify any or all rights of the mortgagee.
The Enewally court’s mention of “logic” may be a reference to this pas-
sage in Nobelman:
The bank’s contractual rights are contained in a unitary note that applies at
once to the bank’s overall claim, including both the secured and unsecured
components. Petitioners cannot modify the payment and interest terms for
the unsecured component, as they propose to do, without also modifying
the terms of the secured component. Thus, to preserve the interest rate and
the amount of each monthly payment specified in the note after having
reduced the principal to $23,500, the plan would also have to reduce the
term of the note dramatically. That would be a significant modification of
a contractual right.179
The “logic” would be that the modification and payment maintenance
sought in Enewally would reduce the term of the note in the same manner
that the prohibited modification would have in Nobelman. But that logic of
Nobelman does not apply to Enewally. By the Court’s reasoning, modifica-
tion was prohibited in Nobelman because the mortgage was against a princi-
pal residence. But modification was not prohibited in Enewally because the
mortgage was not against a principal residence.
Despite the poor quality of its reasoning, Enewally is the law of the
Ninth Circuit. As a result, modification and payment maintenance is not
likely to succeed in that circuit. Some courts in other parts of the country
have followed the Enewally view.180 Others have rejected that view.181 Most
courts, however, have not yet ruled on the issue in a reported opinion.
Hence, before employing the strategy advocated here, attorneys should at-
tempt to determine how judges on the local panel are likely to rule.
178. Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 328 (1993) (“[Subsection 1322(b)(2)]
does not state that a plan may modify ‘claims’ or that the plan may not modify ‘a claim
secured only by’ a home mortgage. Rather, it focuses on the modification of the ‘rights of
holders’ of such claims.”).
179. Id. at 331.
180. E.g., JPMorgan Chase Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Galaske, 476 B.R. 405, 410–13 (D. Vt.
2012) (reversing a bankruptcy court’s order confirming a plan that bifurcated a mortgage and
then reamortized the secured portion over a period longer than the plan); In re Russell, 458
B.R. 731, 737–38 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2010) (discussing Enewally and concluding that the Fourth
Circuit would follow it); In re Plourde, 402 B.R. 488, 491 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2009) (“If the debtor
chooses to modify the terms of the claim, he must pay the amount of the secured claim as
valued by the court in full within the life of plan [sic].”).
181. See In re Elibo, 447 B.R. 359, 364 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011) (rejecting Enewally but
refusing to confirm the plan because it reamortized the secured debt over a period longer than
the plan); see also cases cited supra note 175.
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B. Balloon Payment Plans
A second possible solution to the five-year limit on payments under the
plan is to propose a balloon payment plan. A balloon payment plan is a plan
that provides for amortization of the mortgagee’s secured claim over a pe-
riod beyond the plan—often thirty years—with a single “balloon” payment
of the balance owing at the end of five years. The debtor proposes to make
the balloon payment by selling or refinancing the house.
1. Feasibility
Feasibility is often an issue with balloon payment plans.182 A debtor
proves feasibility by proving the ability “to make all payments under the
plan and to comply with the plan.”183 As one court put it, “Although plans
requiring balloon payments are not necessarily unfeasible, courts view such
plans with suspicion unless the debtor can show through definite and credi-
ble evidence that he will have the financial ability to make the balloon pay-
ment.”184 To determine feasibility, courts consider a variety of factors.185 The
evidence will likely include expert testimony indicating that the house is
likely to appreciate in value over the plan period to a sufficient extent that
the debtor will be able to refinance or sell the house for an amount sufficient
to pay the balance owing on the mortgage.186
182. See, e.g., In re Gillis, 333 B.R. 1, 9 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005) (positing that a proposed
balloon payment plan is feasible); In re St. Cloud, 209 B.R. 801, 809 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997)
(“The majority of courts does not reject balloon payment plans as unfeasible per se and instead
carefully scrutinizes plans with balloon payment provisions on a case-by-case basis, reviewing
a plan’s feasibility based upon the totality of the circumstances.”).
183. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6) (2012).
184. IRS v. Rader (In re Rader), No. TH 01-217-C-T/H, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11057, at
*5–6 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 17, 2002).
185. For example, one court provided this list:
To determine feasibility of a plan where a balloon payment on a secured debt is pro-
posed, courts look to a number of factors. The factors include the future earning capacity
and disposable income of the debtor, whether the plan provides for payment of interest
to secured creditors, the debtor’s perseverance and motivation to execute the plan suc-
cessfully, the type of employment in which the debtor is engaged or may become en-
gaged, whether the plan includes a cushion for unexpected expenses, the equity in the
property, whether the plan provides for recurring charges against the property, and
whether the plan provides for payments to the creditor which will significantly reduce the
debt and enhance the prospects for refinancing at the end of the plan.
Chelsea State Bank v. Wagner (In re Wagner), 259 B.R. 694, 701 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2001); see also
In re Rader, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11057, at *5–6 (listing six factors).
186. See, e.g., In re New Midland Plaza Assocs., 247 B.R. 877, 887 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
2000) (finding balloon payment plan feasible based on expert’s testimony that “the value of
the property would increase between 2% and 3% per year”); In re St. Cloud, 209 B.R. at 810
(finding balloon payment plan feasible based on expert’s testimony that the debtor would have
sufficient equity to refinance after five years of payments).
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The necessary equity will typically come from two sources: (1) house
value appreciation and (2) mortgage pay down. To illustrate the latter, as-
sume that the house has a retail market value of $200,000 at the time of
bankruptcy and is subject to a mortgage that was initially in the amount of
$240,000, payable over thirty years at 8% interest. The monthly payment on
that mortgage would initially have been $1,761. Further, assume that the
current balance is $270,000.
Because the creditor seeks to sell the house and the debtor seeks to sell
or refinance it, the house arguably should be valued net of selling ex-
penses.187 If those selling expenses are estimated at 7% of value, the house
should be valued at $186,000.188 If the debtor maintains payments of $1,761
per month at 8% interest for sixty months, the balance owing will be
$147,614.189 Even if the house has not appreciated at all over the plan period,
the debtor will have built up an equity of $38,386 over the liquidation value
net of selling expenses (21% of the $186,000 value).190
For 2013, market researcher CoreLogic predicts an increase in home
prices of 6%,191 and Freddie Mac reported that home prices rose up to 4%
over in 2012.192 If the value of the debtor’s home in this example increased
by 3% per year for each of the five years of the plan, the total increase would
be from $186,000 to $215,625, an increase of 15.9%.193
If the debtor made the plan payments and the house appreciated in
value at the rate of 3% per year, at the end of five years, the house would be
worth $215,625, and the debtor would owe $147,614 against it. The debtor
would have an equity of $68,011 over the liquidation value net of selling
expenses (31%). With so large an equity, the debtor would likely be able to
refinance before the end of the five-year period and make the balloon pay-
ment. Actual results could fall far short of these projections without render-
ing the plan infeasible.
187. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (“Such value shall be determined in light of the purpose
of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction
with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting such creditor’s interest.”).
188. $200,000 less 7% of $200,000 is $186,000.
189. This is the amount shown as owing on a schedule for the amortization of $186,000
with interest at 8%, in payments of $1,761, at the end of five years.
190. $186,000 less $147,614 is $38,386.
191. Julie Schmit, Forecast: Home Prices Will Rise 6% in 2013, USA Today (Jan. 15,
2013, 1:16 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/01/13/home-prices-
corelogic-forecast/1827723/ (“Home prices . . . will rise 6% in 2013, market researcher Core-
Logic predicts.”).
192. Dunstan Prial, Freddie Mac Sees Traction in 2013 Housing Recovery, Fox Business
(Feb. 8, 2013), http://www.foxbusiness.com/economy/2013/02/08/freddie-mac-sees-traction-
in-2013-housing-recovery/ (“U.S. housing prices are finally rising: up 4% over the past 12
months, according to Freddie Mac, but still down 22% from their peak around 2005.”).
193. $186,000 multiplied by 1.03 is $191,580. $191,580 multiplied by 1.03 is
$197,327.40. $197,327.40 multiplied by 1.03 is $203,247.20. $203,247.20 multiplied by 1.03 is
$209,334.60. $209,334.60 multiplied by 1.03 is $215,625.
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2. Periodic Payments
BAPCPA added the following requirement to subsection 1325(a)(5)(B)
of the Bankruptcy Code: “[I]f . . . property to be distributed pursuant to this
subsection is in the form of periodic payments, such payments shall be in
equal monthly amounts.”194 Read literally, this provision does not prohibit
balloon payment plans. The provision applies only to plan payments “in the
form of periodic payments.”195 Had the drafters intended it to prohibit both
balloon payments and periodic payments, the drafters would have said “all
plan payments” instead of “such payments.”
“Periodic payments” are payments that occur “repeatedly or regu-
larly.”196 Balloon payments do not fit that definition. One court put it as
follows:
Authoritative dictionaries, however, universally agree that the word “peri-
odic” simply refers to an event that occurs repeatedly or regularly. See Web-
ster’s Third New International Dictionary 1680 (1981) (“occurring at
regular intervals”); Merriam–Webster Online Dictionary (“occurring or re-
curring at regular intervals; occurring repeatedly from time to time”);
Black’s Law Dictionary 1165 (8th ed.2004) (defining “periodic payment” as
“[o]ne of a series of payments made over time instead of a one-time pay-
ment for the full amount”).197
The payments that precede balloon payments are repeated and regular, but
balloon payments are not. By definition, a balloon payment is always a last
payment. Debtors make balloon payments by selling or refinancing. As a
result, debtors do not make balloon payments on any schedule that can
fairly be described as “periodic.” Debtors make balloon payments when the
sales or loans close—irrespective of when they make their periodic
payments.
Before and after the enactment of subsection 1325(a)(5)(B)(iii) of the
Bankruptcy Code, debtors used formulae to specify the timing and amounts
of periodic plan payments. For example, a formula might call for equal
monthly payments over the plan period or 100 dollars a month over the first
year and then equal semi-annual payments over the plan period’s remain-
der. The language of subsection 1325(a)(5)(B)(iii) indicates an intention to
standardize these formulae.
The effort to standardize these formulae has nothing to do with balloon
payments because the formulae do not apply to balloon payments. Balloon
194. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(iii)(I) (2012).
195. Id.
196. Hamilton v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 401 B.R. 539, 544 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2009); see
also Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection—12 CFR Part 1026 (Regulation Z)—Truth in
Lending, BankersOnline, http://www.bankersonline.com/regs/12-1026/12-1026-036.html
(last visited Sept. 21, 2013) (showing that, effective January 10, 2014, 12 C.F.R.
§ 1026.36(c)(1)(i) will define “periodic payment” as used in the regulations as the “amount
sufficient to cover principal, interest, and escrow (if applicable) for a given billing cycle”).
197. Hamilton, 401 B.R. at 544.
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payments are one-time payments. The amount of a balloon payment is al-
ways the entire amount owing.
Only a few courts have interpreted subsection 1325(a)(5)(B)(iii) of the
Bankruptcy Code. The plans in those cases were all poorly drafted in one
crucial respect: the balloon payments were “in the form of periodic pay-
ments.” That is, in each case, the plan described the balloon payment as the
last monthly payment in a series of payments. The provisions were merely
the result of drafting errors because the debtors could not actually have in-
tended to make the balloon payments on the periodic dates. The debtors
would have had to make them whenever the sales or loans closed.
Most of these courts held that balloon payments were periodic. Unfor-
tunately, most also stated that the periodic payments provision prohibits
balloon payments.198 As a result, balloon payment plans will be high risk in
most jurisdictions.
Congress has never expressed an intention to ban balloon payments. In
rejecting balloon payment plans, however, some courts cite this statement of
the purported “remedial purpose” of the periodic payment provision:
Prior to BAPCPA, it was not uncommon for some Chapter 13 plans to
provide for backloaded payments, such as balloon payments. Another form
of backloading involved graduated or step-up payment plans, where the
payments started out smaller and increased over time. Secured creditors,
particularly those secured by a vehicle, viewed this as unfair, exposing them
to undue risk in light of the constant depreciation of their collateral.
Other plans, filed by debtors whose employment is seasonal, provided for
reduced payments or no payments at all during certain months of the year,
or called for payments to be made quarterly or semi-annually, rather than
monthly, based upon the peculiarities of the debtor’s income stream. Se-
cured creditors had similar complaints with those plans.
In response to those creditor concerns, Congress enacted the equal pay-
ment provision and a companion provision extending the concept of ade-
quate protection, formerly a preconfirmation requirement, to
postconfirmation plan payments. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(iii)(II). The
equal payment provision prevents debtors from backloading payments to
secured creditors or paying them other than on a monthly basis.199
198. Id. at 546; In re Cupolo, No. 12-51633, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 486, at *4 (Bankr. E.D.
Ky. Feb. 5, 2013); In re Bollinger, No. 10-62344-fra13, 2011 WL 3882275, at *4 (Bankr. D. Or.
Sept. 2, 2011); In re Luckett, No. 07-24706-SVK, 2007 WL 3125278, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Wis.
Oct. 24, 2007); In re Erwin, 376 B.R. 897, 901 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2007); In re Lemieux, 347 B.R.
460, 464 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2006); In re Wagner, 342 B.R. 766, 772 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2006); In
re DeSardi, 340 B.R. 790, 810 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006). Contra In re Vause, No. 6:09-bk-06224-
ABB, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 831, at *3 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2010); In re Cooper, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS
3737, at *7–8 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009); In re Davis, 343 B.R. 326, 328 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006).
But see William J. McLeod, Trick or Treat: A (Not-So)-Scary Look at Equal Monthly Payments
Under § 1325(a)(5), Am. Bankr. Inst. J., Oct. 2008, at 14, 71 (“[I]t appears that so long as the
court determines that step payment plans or balloon payment plans do not run afoul of
§ 1322 or 1325(a), those plans may be confirmed in the absence of an objection.”).
199. In re Erwin, 376 B.R. at 901.
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This statement is not formal legislative history. It is apparently merely
one court’s understanding of what Congress might have intended. The for-
mal legislative history does not support that court’s reading.200
Even assuming that the quoted passage correctly describes the problem
that Congress sought to address, it does not follow that Congress intended
to ban balloon payments. The language Congress used indicates a more lim-
ited purpose: to standardize the formulae for specifying periodic payments,
without banning balloon payments. Congress may have thought that such
standardization would make it easier for courts to assess and control the
backloading problem, while at the same time continuing to allow balloon
payments as a safety valve.
C. House-Distribution Plans
In jurisdictions where courts have rejected balloon payment plans, the
solution may be for a debtor to distribute the debtor’s house to the mort-
gage holder under the plan, subject to the debtor’s option to repurchase it
on or before the due date of the last plan payment. Such a plan does not
propose a balloon payment. Instead, the plan proposes to transfer the house
to the mortgage holder in equal monthly distributions, reserving in the
debtor the right to repurchase the transferred portion by paying an amount
equal to, or greater than, the mortgage debt.
To illustrate, such a plan might propose that the debtor will make sixty
equal monthly distributions of property to the secured creditor, having an
aggregate value, as of the effective date of the plan, equal to or greater than
the amount of the secured claim. Each payment will consist of (1) a periodic
payment of cash in the amount necessary to amortize the secured claim over
a period of thirty years and provide adequate protection and (2) the transfer
of a one-sixtieth ownership interest in the house, subject to the debtor’s
right to possession during the plan period. The plan would also provide the
debtor the option, exercisable at any time prior to the due date of the last
payment under the plan, to extinguish the mortgage debt and repurchase
any ownership interest previously transferred by paying the mortgage holder
an amount equal to, or greater than, the mortgage holder’s secured claim.
The debtor can fix the option price by a provision in the plan.201 Be-
cause the debtor is already proposing to pay the mortgage holder the
amount of the secured claim, no minimum option price is required. The
200. See H.R. Rep. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 71–74 (2005). The history states only as
follows:
Section 309(c)(1) amends Bankruptcy Code section 1325(a)(5)(B) to require that peri-
odic payments pursuant to a chapter 13 plan with respect to a secured claim be made in
equal monthly installments. Where the claim is secured by personal property, the
amount of such payments shall not be less than the amount sufficient to provide ade-
quate protection to the holder of such claim.
Id. at 73.
201. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(11) (2012) (“[T]he plan may . . . include any other appro-
priate provision not inconsistent with this title.”).
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debtor may choose to offer a nominal amount in cash, or a significant
amount in the form of a right in the creditor to share in the house’s future
appreciation, subject to the rights of any future buyer or future financier.
Such a plan complies with subparagraph B of subsection 1325(a)(5) of
the Bankruptcy Code because the value of the property to be distributed
under the plan “is not less than the allowed amount of [the secured] claim,”
and the payments—whether “payments” is interpreted to mean only mone-
tary payments or distribution of any type of property—are in equal monthly
amounts.202
V. Advantages of Swapping
The legal strategies presented in this Article are equally applicable to
debtors who lease each other’s houses and to debtors who merely move out
of their own houses and lease other houses. But the swap offers some
advantages.
In a swap, two debtors live in similar houses in the same neighborhood.
Each moves out of the debtor’s own house and moves into the other’s house.
Each signs a lease agreeing to pay a market, or slightly below market, rental
rate. If the debtors are well matched, the houses will be of the same size and
quality, and the rent payments can be made by set-off.203 The risk of non-
payment of rent is minimal because so long as the debtors remain in the
houses, neither need make a cash payment.204
Swapping also has other advantages. First, the swapping debtors will file
in the same bankruptcy court, will likely receive the same rulings, and there-
fore will likely need the properties for the same periods. Second, both debt-
ors can be assured of suitable rental housing at the time they commit to the
swap strategy. Third, financially distressed debtors may have difficulty quali-
fying for rental housing on the open market. But a bankruptcy attorney can,
in effect, qualify swapping debtors as tenants for each other. Fourth, swap-
ping enables the debtors to rent homes that are similar to, and physically
close to, those that they own. Moving will not disrupt the debtors’ patterns
of living, commuting, or shopping, or require changes in the schools their
202. Id. § 1325(a)(5)(B). By relying solely on subparagraph B, the debtor avoids the
issue of whether a debtor may use a combination of property distribution under B and surren-
der under C. See, e.g., In re Gunten, No. 10-21227, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 2357, at *4–5 (Bankr.
D. Wyo. June 14, 2011); In re Elkins, No. 04-67961, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 2900, at *9 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio Aug. 16, 2005) (“The Court concludes—like the Williams, Covington and Schwartz
courts—that § 1325(a)(5) sets forth mutually exclusive options for the treatment of secured
claims, not alternatives that may be combined to form a composite remedy.”), cited in In re
Gunten, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 2357, at *4.
203. Each of the two debtors would owe the other the same amount of money for rent
each month. Both debts would be cancelled without the necessity of payment because payment
of both debts would have no net effect. Neither debtor would make a payment to the other.
The tax treatment of the rentals is beyond the scope of this Article.
204. The debtors could nevertheless default on their leases in respects other than non-
payment. For example, one of the debtors might damage the house in a manner not covered
by insurance.
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children attend. Rental homes may not be available in the same neighbor-
hood at a reasonable price.
Chapter 13 debtors can reject unexpired leases in their Chapter 13
plans.205 Two kinds of rejection are possible. First, a debtor may reject a lease
under which the debtor is the lessor. Debtors can virtually eliminate that
risk by filing simultaneously and commencing their leases immediately prior
to filing. Once a lease term commences, the occupying debtor cannot be
dislodged through lease rejection.206
Second, a debtor may reject the lease under which the debtor is the
lessee. That risk would be small because the debtor would have made the
decision to lease very recently and would have just incurred the expense of
moving and filing the bankruptcy case. One can imagine, however, situa-
tions in which a debtor unexpectedly loses a job or an employer transfers the
debtor to another city. Debtors can limit this risk by combining the leases in
a single agreement that provides for an exchange of occupancy of the
houses.
Either debtor could reject the exchange agreement and abandon the
property, but rejection would release the other debtor from the reciprocal
obligation to continue leasing the rejecting debtor’s house. The effect would
be that the rejecting debtor would be free to move to a new job, the rejecting
debtor’s lender would be free to foreclose, and the nonrejecting debtor
would be free to return to the nonrejecting debtor’s own house. An added
benefit is that the return could occur immediately upon breach instead of at
the end of the one-year term of the lease.
The nonrejecting debtor could still qualify for mortgage modification
because the nonrejecting debtor did not occupy the rented house on the
petition date. If, at the time of rejection, the nonrejecting debtor was con-
cerned about the court’s perception of these events, the nonrejecting debtor
could prove good faith by remaining in the rental house and finding a sub-
stitute tenant.
The analysis is similar for the situation in which one debtor is able to
confirm a plan (the “Successful Debtor”), but the other debtor is not (the
“Unsuccessful Debtor”). If the Unsuccessful Debtor loses the house to fore-
closure, the purchaser at the foreclosure sale could eject the Successful
205. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(7) (“[A] plan may . . . provide for the . . . rejection . . . of any
. . . unexpired lease of the debtor . . . .”).
206. Id. § 365(h)(1)(A)(ii) (“If the trustee rejects an unexpired lease of real property
under which the debtor is the lessor and . . . if the term of such lease has commenced, the
lessee may retain its rights under such lease (including rights such as those relating to the
amount and timing of payment of rent and other amounts payable by the lessee and any right
of use, possession, quiet enjoyment, subletting, assignment, or hypothecation) that are in or
appurtenant to the real property for the balance of the term of such lease and for any renewal
or extension of such rights to the extent that such rights are enforceable under applicable
nonbankruptcy law.”).
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Debtor.207 But the Successful Debtor could evict the Unsuccessful Debtor
and move back into the Successful Debtor’s own house.
Swapping has the obvious disadvantage of requiring a match of two
debtors. High-volume Chapter 13 attorneys are the most likely matchmak-
ers. It is unlikely that debtors who could benefit from home mortgage modi-
fication in Chapter 13 would be aware of this possibility. Attorney
advertising may be an effective way to spread the word that bankruptcy
mortgage modification is available.
Conclusion
Mortgage modification through bankruptcy is the best solution to the
foreclosure crisis. It will enable debtors who can afford their homes to stay
in them, assure mortgage holders greater returns than they would get
through foreclosure, and relieve the downward pressure on housing prices
that results from the resale of foreclosed houses.
Other institutions could modify home mortgages. But the bankruptcy
system is preferable. Bankruptcy mortgage modification will not deprive
mortgage holders of the substantial cash flow that they receive from Can-
Pay-Loan-Balance Borrowers on underwater mortgages because only Can-
Pay-Value Borrowers qualify for bankruptcy relief. The standards for bank-
ruptcy relief are well developed and the bankruptcy judiciary is experienced
in administering them.
The move-out, strip-down strategy provides a way around Nobelman. It
takes advantage of the flexibility that Congress apparently intended in the
antimodification exception. For the strategy to work will require the com-
bined efforts of debtors desperate to save their homes, attorneys capable of
administering a complex strategy, and judges willing to follow the law even
though it disadvantages powerful interests. If a few debtors succeed, their
success will inspire others. If enough succeed, their success may sufficiently
embarrass the country’s political leaders so that they will legislate an end to
Nobelman.
207. Under the law of most states, mortgages have priority over leases unless the parties
agree otherwise. See, e.g., Reilly v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 764 F.2d 167, 171 (3d Cir.
1985) (“The general rule in Pennsylvania is clear and is not disputed by the parties: a tenant
for years loses his right of possession relative to a purchaser at a judicial sale when the foreclo-
sure is on a mortgage recorded prior to the making of the lease.”).
